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Freedom of the Press in Post-Truthism America 
RonNell Andersen Jones* and Lisa Grow Sun* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of the press in America is at a critical crossroads in a number of 
ways, but one way stands out as most fundamental: the stark impact of the 
current debate over “Post-Truthism.” Press freedom jurisprudence has 
long been structured around the concept of an audience member’s search 
for truth in a marketplace of ideas. But social science research increasingly 
suggests that individual information consumers are in fact often driven by 
emotion, political identity, and the need for cognitive shortcuts, and that 
they may not possess the truthseeking, rational processing, or information-
updating capabilities that the Court assumes. The individual search for 
truth in the marketplace of ideas, some have suggested, is not happening—
or at least not happening in the way the United States Supreme Court’s 
press jurisprudence has envisioned. 
 
Whether this divide between jurisprudence and reality actually exists—
and what to do about it if it does—are pressing questions for both the 
courts and the media, made all the more pressing as the changing media 
landscape and the modern political climate exacerbate some components 
of the Post-Truthism critique. The concern for some is that if press 
freedom has rested on flawed assumptions about the nature of press 
audiences, the growing awareness of those limitations may undermine the 
marketplace-of-ideas justification for press freedom and its associated 
press protections.  
 
This Article investigates both questions. It finds that the factual premise—
that the Supreme Court has made erroneous assumptions about the 
motivations and behaviors of information audiences—is accurate, but 
argues that the theoretical consequence of this gap is just the opposite of 
what some have suggested. Instead of undercutting the rationales for press 
protection, this wider modern understanding of the information-processing 
and truthseeking limitations of individual press consumers in the 
marketplace of ideas actually underscores the need for protection of the 
press as a market-enhancing institution. The Article argues that a fuller 
appreciation of this dynamic can provide helpful insight into why the 
Constitution might provide unique Press Clause protections and into some 
of the functions that would qualify an institutional actor as “the press” for 
purposes of that constitutional protection—an identification process that 
will be increasingly vital as information consumers shift from legacy 
media to new forms of content delivery. The Article probes these 
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functions and offers a conceptual framework for granting Press Clause 
protection to market-enhancing entities that compensate for the inherent 
shortcomings of individual information consumers. 
 
Part II describes the epistemological phenomenon of Post-Truthism and 
the concerns it has raised about the validity of the marketplace-of-ideas 
metaphor in the press freedom context.  
 
Part III compares the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterizations of the 
behaviors and capabilities of press audiences in the marketplace of ideas 
with social science data about the actual behaviors and capabilities of 
those audiences. Part III.A identifies the three most foundational 
assumptions made by the Court—what we label the Truthseeking 
Assumption, the Rational-Processing Assumption, and the Updating 
Assumption—and then Part III.B describes the evidence that these 
assumptions are seriously flawed. 
 
Part IV questions the theoretical response to this gap between assumption 
and audience reality, pushing back against the conclusion that a greater 
awareness of audience limitations within the marketplace of ideas should 
erode the foundation of press protection. It describes the ways that press-
audience limitations create compelling reasons to protect the marketplace-
enhancing functions of the press and urges that the ongoing effort to 
imbue the Press Clause with substantive meaning take these compensating 
functions into account. 
 
Part V concludes, arguing that the protection-of-press-functions approach 
allows the Court to acknowledge the flaws of individual information 
seekers without abandoning the aspiration of fact-based, public reasoning 
and that it will provide a clear path forward for strengthening the press 
institutions that promote and support those important norms of informed 
public discourse. This doctrinal guidance is critically important in the 




II. POST-TRUTHISM AND THE PRESS 
 
It has become almost a commonplace to suggest that America is in the 
midst of an epistemic crisis, a crisis that challenges long-settled 
expectations about how we come to know truth and about the role that 
objectively provable, verifiable facts can or should play in decision-
making on matters of public concern.1 Indeed, many have suggested that 
we may be at a crossroads—at the advent of a new “Post-Truthism” age in 
which objective facts and deliberative decision-making are subordinated to 
                                                
1 See, e.g., David Roberts, America is Facing an Epistemic Crisis, VOX.COM, Nov. 2, 
2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/2/16588964/america-epistemic-
crisis; LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH (2018). 




emotion and partisanship in the search for truth.2 These shifts arguably 
threaten development of the shared understandings about the world that 
traditionally have been thought to undergird and sustain democratic 
decision-making. 
Many political elites and other influencers are increasingly promoting a 
worldview in which a crude version of truth-as-feeling seems to substitute 
for empirical evidence.3 Thus, for example, when CNN reporter Alisyn 
Camerota confronted former Speaker of the House and Contract-with-
America author Newt Gingrich with FBI statistics contradicting his claim 
that violent crime was up in America, he insisted that his assertion was 
“also a fact. . . . The current view is that liberals have a whole set of 
statistics that theoretically may be right, but it’s not where human beings 
are.”4 When the reporter pushed back, Gingrich repeatedly insisted that 
people’s feelings about crime levels were “equally” as “true” as FBI 
statistics and that, as a politician, he would “go with how people feel and 
let [the reporter] go with the theoreticians.”5  
Claims that we are in a Post-Truthism era have likewise been heightened 
by developments in the Trump administration—including Kellyanne 
Conway’s insistence that White House Press Secretary’s Sean Spicer’s 
false claims about the size of the Trump inauguration crowd were 
“alternative facts,” not misstatements or falsehoods,6 and attorney Rudy 
Giuliani’s much-parodied suggestion that “Truth isn’t truth.”7  
 
And, of course, the figure who has loomed largest in much Post-Truthism 
commentary is President Trump himself, who has a notoriously loose 
relationship with the truth and who often labels journalism “fake news” 
when that coverage is unflattering, even when the underlying facts are 
correct.8 Many have noted that President Trump seems to care little about 
                                                
2 See, e.g., See Sarah Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351 (2019); 
MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: NOTES ON FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE OF 
TRUMP (2018); MCINTYRE, supra note 1; Derek Bacon, Yes, I’d Lie to You; The Post-
Truth World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2016, available at 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/09/10/yes-id-lie-to-you. 
3 See Haan, supra note 2. 
4 Quoted in LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 4 (2018). 
5 Id.  
6 Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd Size, 
CNN.COM, Jan. 23, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-
alternative-facts/index.html. 
7 Caroline Kenny, Rudy Guiliani Says “Truth Isn’t Truth,” CNN.com, Aug. 19, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/rudy-giuliani-truth-isnt-truth/index.html. 
8 See Leslie Stahl: Trump Admitted Mission to Discredit the Press, CBS NEWS, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesley-stahl-donald-trump-said-attacking-press-to-
discredit-negative-stories/ (last updated May 23, 2018) (quoting Trump as saying, “I do it 
to discredit you all and demean you all so when you write negative stories about me, no 
one will believe you.”). 




empirical facts, as evidenced by the fact that he has made more than 
16,000 “false or misleading claims” since taking office.9  
 
These changing mores about truth among politicians and other powerful 
elites have coincided with the popularization of a growing body of social 
science research that highlights real limitations in human rationality and 
cognition and the influence that emotion and “motivated reasoning”—
driven by our desires to belong, to feel safe, and to express important 
aspects of our identity—do, in fact, have on the ways we seek out and 
process information about the world around us. Even as some politicians 
have seemed to affirmatively endorse and even celebrate these limitations 
and biases in human cognition, many commentators have bemoaned what 
these social science findings might mean for both our individual ability to 
be decent, informed democratic citizens and our collective search for 
truth.10 
 
Nowhere have these concerns played out more forcefully than in the 
ongoing public conversation about the role of “the press” in our 
democracy. From debates about “fake news,” to conversations about 
declining trust in the media, to concerns about online “echo chambers” 
that may reinforce and amplify people’s existing views, there is a lively 
and impassioned debate about what this social science research and the 
Post-Truthism era, more generally, mean for the future of the press and 
press freedoms.11   
This focus is hardly surprising, given the critical role that the press plays 
in gathering and distributing the information that propels us forward in our 
                                                
9 FACT CHECKER, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-
database/?utm_term=.0d533cea94c7, last visited Feb. 21, 2020. 
10 See, e.g, Bacon, supra note 2; ARI RABIN-HAVT & MEDIA MATTERS, LIES, 
INCORPORATED: THE WORLD OF POST-TRUTH POLITICS (2016); Katharine Viner, How 
Technology Disrupted the Truth, GUARDIAN, July 12, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth; 
David Roberts, Donald Trump and the Rise of Tribal Epistemology, VOX, May 19, 2017, 
9:58 AM, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/22/14762030/donald-trump-
tribal-epistemology; Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, Truth Isn’t the Problem—We Are, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2018, 10:36 AM, https://www.wsj.com/articles/truth-isnt-the-
problemwe-are-1521124562; ., Marty Kaplan, The Most Depressing Brain Finding Ever, 
Nov. 16, 2013, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/most-depressing-brain-
fin_b_3932273. 
11 See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 J. CONSTL. LAW 845, 
848  (noting that some scholars have argued that “the inability of consumers to discern 
good ideas from bad” results in “market failure[s]” like the rise of fake news, which 
justify “government intervention” and regulation”); Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a 
“Marketplace of Ideas” and the Right to Truth, 3 AMERICAN AFFAIRS 1 (Spring 2019), 
198-209, available at https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/the-illusion-of-a-
marketplace-of-ideas-and-the-right-to-truth/#notes 
(arguing that, given market failures like “bounded rationality and the echo chamber 
effect,” “[r]egulation of ‘information markets’ is needed in order to aid better 
dissemination of news and sustain less profitable sources that have a special role in our 
democracies”). 




collective search for truth. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has long 
emphasized the press’s role in enabling the “marketplace of ideas” as a 
critical normative justification for press freedom.12   
While this marketplace-of-ideas theory has long been criticized for a 
variety of conceptual and practical flaws,13 the Post-Truthism ethos and 
emerging social science suggest new criticisms focused on the Court’s 
conception of a rational, truthseeking press audience. Some of the theory’s 
core assumptions—about press audiences’ desires, about their behaviors, 
and about their capabilities—appear out of step with the real world of 
American media consumption.  
 
This national conversation on Post-Truthism and the press presupposes 
both a factual premise and a theoretical consequence. The factual premise 
is that there is a gap between, on the one hand, what the Supreme Court’s 
marketplace-of-ideas analogy seems to assume about press audiences and, 
on the other, what is accurate about those audiences as a matter of 
cognitive behavioral science. The theoretical consequence is that this 
fundamental market failure might dictate greater government regulation of 
the press—that is, that an increased recognition that press freedom has 
rested on flawed assumptions about the nature of press audiences could 
remove the underpinnings of the marketplace-of-ideas justification for that 
freedom. These arguments—which might find particular resonance in 
some corners at a moment of new, intensified attacks on the press and 
press freedom14—suggest that our new awareness of audience limitations 
might sound the death knell for any marketplace-based press protections.  
 
Perhaps more than in any other area of First Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Court’s marketplace-of-ideas approach in press cases does explicitly 
and implicitly make assumptions that have never been fully explored or 
challenged, in part because some of them seem so fundamental that they 
have been perceived as incontrovertible: People consuming journalism 
will seek after provable facts. They will rationally process the information 
they gather from the news. They will use press coverage to challenge their 
previous views and will update those views when provided with contrary 
information. They will believe there is such a thing as truth. But modern 
social science may teach that many of these most basic and deeply held 
assumptions are, in fact, flawed, and that the Court has mischaracterized 
                                                
12 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Free Speech, 161 U. PENN. LAW 
REV. 1445, 1454 (2013) (observing that the “best-known conception” of the First 
Amendment “and that most commonly invoked by the Supreme Court, is the marketplace 
of ideas)”. 
13 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 25 
(1982); Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. 
LAW REV. 1160 (2015); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 DUKE L. J. 1 (1984) (arguing that the market is “strongly biased in favor of . . . 
entrenched interests”). 
14 See, e.g., sources cited in note 11, supra. 




what individual press audience members in the marketplace of ideas want, 
what they do, and what they are capable of doing. 
 
Importantly, however, the theoretical consequence of this gap between 
Court assumption and real-world reality is not the abandonment of the 
marketplace of ideas as a justification for press freedom. To the contrary. 
Instead of undercutting the rationales for press protection, this wider 
modern understanding of the information-processing and truthseeking 
limitations of individual press consumers in the marketplace of ideas 
actually underscores the need for protection of the press as a market-
enhancing institution. Citizens are unlikely, on their own, to be able to 
find truth or acquire knowledge as individual actors in the way the 
marketplace of ideas theory envisions. But market-enhancing press actors 
can compensate for audience limitations in the marketplace of ideas—by 
newsgathering, prioritizing, verifying, contextualizing, and accessing 
places and information on the individual’s behalf. Appreciating this 
dynamic can help illuminate why the Constitution might separately 
provide unique protection under the Press Clause and provide insight into 
some of the functions that would qualify an institutional actor for that 
protection.  
 
Thus, this critical jurisprudential and technological juncture warrants a 
deeper investigation both of the gap between Supreme Court assumption 
and information-consumer reality and of the benefits of a doctrinal focus 
on market-enhancing press functions. 
 
III.  THE GAP BETWEEN SUPREME COURT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
PRESS AUDIENCES AND THE REALITY 
While strands of press-praising dicta in many Supreme Court cases discuss 
the important role the press plays in informing citizens and promoting 
democracy,15 the Court has not offered one unifying theory of press 
freedom. Instead, it has addressed the roles and rights of press actors in a 
variety of categories of cases, like defamation,16 access,17 prior restraints 
on publication,18 editorial discretion,19 taxation and other regulation of the 
                                                
15 See Sonja R. West, Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-36 (2014); RonNell 
Andersen Jones, Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705 (2014); RonNell 
Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks about the Press Clause and Why It 
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2014). 
16 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 137 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
17 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984); 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978). 
18 See Nebraska Press. Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976); New York Times Co. v. 
United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697, 703 (1931). 




press,20 and publication of true private facts.21 Nevertheless, the Court 
often references the press’s important role in the “marketplace of ideas” 
and makes clear assumptions about the audiences of press coverage and 
their role as consumers in the marketplace of ideas—assumptions that 
deserve serious attention and analysis. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Assumptions about Press Audiences 
 
1. The Truthseeking Assumption  
First, a core assumption in the Court’s press freedom cases is that press 
audiences seek out empirical truth. They believe that such truth exists and 
demand that it be provided to them. The Court envisions information 
consumers as individuals who desire provable facts and are actively 
expending resources in the search for additional evidence to enlarge their 
catalogs of truthful, factual information and to test their previous beliefs 
on important matters.  
In the most classic formulation of this notion, the Court in the watershed 
press case of New York Times v. Sullivan22 constitutionalized the law of 
libel on the assumption of a press audience that would seek “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open”23 debate on matters of public concern. This vision 
of an audience member who is actively searching for truth in a workable 
marketplace of ideas permeates every press-focused case from the Court. 
The theoretical assumptions that are made about audiences more generally 
in First Amendment doctrine—that they rationally seek truth, evaluate all 
contributions to the marketplace, and reasonably interpret what they are 
told24— are even more pronounced in the context of cases focused on 
press coverage and the consumers of that coverage. Press audiences are 
                                                                                                                     
19 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974); CBS v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 97 (1973). 
20 See Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm’n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
576 (1983); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240 (1936). 
21 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (publishing intercepted and 
taped cellular phone call); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (publishing 
rape victim’s name based on public police report); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 
U.S. 97, 98 (1979) (publishing name of juvenile offender); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975) (publishing name of deceased rape victim).  
22 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
23 Id. at 270. 
24 Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fool: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799 (2010), Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, 
Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649 
(2006); Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions 
in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2003);  David S. Han, The Mechanics of 
First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647 (2014). 




assumed to be pursuing what is “truthful,”25 searching available materials 
for that truth, and doing all they can to avoid deception.26 
So, for example, the Court’s anticipated newspaper reader in defamation 
cases eagerly desires to know what is true, and the press needs a wide 
swath of protection from liability in order to continue looking for that truth 
on behalf of that reader.27 Cases focused on protecting the editorial 
discretion of news outlets do so on the expectation that those organizations 
will be motivated to serve the truthseeking desires of their viewers and 
subscribers.28 Press-freedom cases focused on the sacrosanct protection 
for publishing truthful information that is lawfully obtained29 and the core 
right of the press to be free from governmental prior restraints30 operate on 
the premises that objective truth exists, that press consumers are interested 
in and seeking after it, and that shutting down press coverage unfairly robs 
those audiences of the chance to know or test that truth.31  
Throughout the cases, the press is depicted as investigating and probing on 
behalf of a truthseeking audience.32 The assumption is that audience 
                                                
25 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (“Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings 
have been afforded special protection . . . .”); Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (“[T]ruthfully 
publishing information released to the public . . . .”); id. at 496 (“Once true information is 
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be 
sanctioned for publishing it.”). 
26 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (“[P]aramount among the 
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from 
deceiving the people . . . .”). 
27 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (“That erroneous statement is inevitable in free 
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive . . . .’”) (citation omitted). 
28 See Tornillo, 418 U.S at 255 (“The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance 
its own political, social, and economic views is bounded by” the needs of its subscribers) 
(quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)); see also RonNell 
Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 499, 522–23 (2019) (describing the relationship between the press and 
those it serves). 
29 See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); see also Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. at 533–34 (holding that the state may not punish a publisher that lawfully obtained 
an intercepted telephone conversation even when third party illegally intercepted and 
recorded it); Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that “where a newspaper publishes 
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be 
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . . 
.”); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103–104 (1979) (“If the information is 
lawfully obtained . . . the state may not punish its publication” unless furthering a “state 
interest of the highest order”), Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cox, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) 
(holding that states may not impose sanctions for accurately reporting the “name of a rape 
victim obtained from public records” that are available for “public inspection”). 
30 See Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 541; Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 
283 U.S. at 703. 
31 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 788 (describing the “chilling effect” of 
subsequent punishment of the press and the “freezing” effect of prior restraints). 
32 See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491 (stating that the public “relies necessarily upon the press to 
bring to him in convenient form the facts of [government] operations.”); Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572–73 (stating that the public “acquire[s] [information] chiefly 




members are themselves driven to dig for more information, uncover 
factual details, and get to the bottom of what is happening in their 
communities. 33  The major press-freedom cases thus characterize 
information consumers as fundamentally fact-motivated—as needing, 
expecting, and seeking empirical facts.34  
By the Court’s telling of things, the press audience strives primarily to be 
“informed.” 35  Readers and viewers work to be knowledgeable 36  and 
educated. 37  And the press’s job is to meet this “public need for 
information and education with respect to the significant issues of the 
times.”38 The “dissemination of information and opinion on questions of 
public concern” to these eager recipients is “ordinarily a legitimate, 
protected and indeed cherished activity,”39 because “the protection of the 
public requires not merely discussion, but information.”40  
                                                                                                                     
through the print and electronic media” rather than by “firsthand observation” and as a 
result, the media as a surrogate is “validate[d]”). 
33 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572–73 (“Instead of acquiring information about 
trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now 
acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the 
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.”); Cox,  420 U.S. at  491 
(suggesting that a citizen would like to “observe at first hand the operations of his 
government, but that citizens “rel[y] on the press to bring . . .  facts of those operations” 
in “convenient form”). 
34 See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491–92  (discussing the responsibility of the press to “report fully 
and accurately the proceedings of government,” which requires access to “official records 
and documents open to the public.”), Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[A] free press . . . provid[es] the people with the widest 
possible range of fact and opinion . . . .”); Tornillo, 418 U.S at 241, n. 24 (A journal does 
not merely print observed facts . . . As soon as the facts are set in their context, you have 
interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection opens the way to editorial 
suppression.”) 
35 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his protection is not for the 
private benefit of those who might qualify as representatives of the ‘press’ but to insure 
that the citizens are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and importance.”). 
See also Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (referencing the need for “the media to inform citizens 
about the public business”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 
(1980) (calling the press the “chief[]” source of public information); Estes v. Texas, 381 
U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (praising the press for “informing the citizenry of public events and 
occurrences”); Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (“In the First 
Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill 
its essential role in our democracy. . . . The press was protected so that it could bare the 
secrets of government and inform the people”); Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he public’s right to be informed of [criminal] 
proceedings”); Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (calling for “the circulation of information to 
which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties”). 
36 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (describing the role of the press in “the acquisition of 
knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs”). 
37 See Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press, supra note 15, at 256–57; 
RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ. 
ST. L. REV. 1301, 1360–63 (2017). 
38 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). 
39 Butts, 388 U.S. at 150. 
40 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272. 




The press audience member envisioned by the Court is not stingy in her 
search for information; rather, she hopes for complete, accurate details41 
on the matters that she considers. The assumed audience member does not 
want one-sided information. Instead, the Court’s key press cases 
repeatedly emphasize the need to protect the press in order to ensure that 
there is “vigor”42 and “variety”43 in information flow. The Court says the 
press “serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the 
dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many 
different facets and colors as is possible.”44 
Discussing the need for reporters to be protected in their use of 
confidential sources, Justice Stewart emphasizes that information 
consumers seek “the widest possible range of fact and opinion.”45 His 
construct for a qualified reporters’ privilege46 roots that protection in the 
notion that audiences desire and are actively seeking “in-depth, 
investigative reporting.”47 
Although courts have consistently defined “newsworthiness” in broader 
terms to include many other matters of interest,48 a central assumption in 
the key press-freedom cases is that audience will desire news about the 
“major public issues of our time.”49 Indeed, a permeating theme of the 
Court’s press freedom cases is that press audiences will want detailed 
information from the press about their public servants that they can use to 
scrutinize the people and institutions of power and to demand 
responsiveness from them. 
                                                
41 Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news 
media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government”); Branzburg, 408 
U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing the press needs protection to deliver on “the 
First Amendment guarantee of the fullest flow of information”). 
42 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
43 Id.; see also Butts, 388 U.S. at 151 (limitations on the press must not “deprive our free 
society of the stimulating benefit of varied ideas”); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is obviously a continuing need for an independent press to 
disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through reportage, investigation, 
and criticism”). 
44 Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602–603 (1953). 
45 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 725–26; see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2013) (noting that lower courts have recognized a “First 
Amendment-based reporter’s privilege based on Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg”). 
47 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (warning against impairing 
the “flow of news to the public, especially in sensitive areas involving government 
officials, financial affairs, political figures, dissidents or minority groups that require in-
depth, investigative reporting”). 
48 AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE (2015). 
49 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275. See also Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (referring to 
the “contemporary news value of the information the press seeks to disseminate” and 
noting that “the damage [of a prior restraint] can be particularly great when the prior 
restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current events”). 




The press consumers depicted by the Court are genuinely interested in 
useful assessments of government performance. They have “ardor as 
citizens” 50 and care about “the proper conduct of public business.”51 The 
assumption is broad, suggesting audience interest in keeping an eye on 
public services from “the least to the most important” 52 and interest in 
public actors in the legislative, 53  executive, 54  and judicial 55  branches. 
These audiences are characterized as seeking knowledge that serves a 
“watchdog”56 or “checking”57 function, and as being particularly in search 
of truthful information about government mistakes or misbehavior. The 
Court thoroughly embraces the notion that the citizenry wants information 
about “official neglect,” “official misconduct,” or “the opportunities for 
malfeasance and corruption,”58 and material that might “expose deception 
in government,” 59  uncover “corruption among public officers and 
                                                
50 Id. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
51 Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495. 
52 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85 
(suggesting particularly strong interest in “those among the hierarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or 
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”) (footnote omitted). 
53 Cox, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Without the information provided by the press most of us and 
many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently . . . .”); Pentagon 
Papers, 403 U.S. at 720 (Black, J., concurring) (stating we need a “free press . . . in order 
to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion and to that end that government 
may be responsible to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained 
by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of 
constitutional government.”) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). 
54 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that “the only 
effective restraint upon executive policy and power . . . may lie in an enlightened 
citizenry . . . .”); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Without some 
protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions 
such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the 
Framers would be stripped of its substance.”); Near, 283 U.S. at 718–19 (discussing 
“public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion 
in the press”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“The people must therefore depend on the press for information concerning public 
institutions.”). 
55 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539 (“The free press has been a mighty catalyst in . . . exposing 
corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of 
public events and occurrences, including court proceedings.”);  Nebraska Press Ass’n, 
427 U.S. at 539 (noting the press “does not simply publish information about trials but 
guards against the miscarriage of justice . . . .”) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 
333, 350 (1966); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350 (calling the press “the handmaiden of 
effective judicial administration . . . .”). 
56 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (describing “the press as a watchdog of 
government activity.”) 
57 Id. at 447 (“The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse . . . .”); 
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v, United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602–603 (1953). See 
generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. 
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521–649 (1977). 
58 Near, 283 U.S. at 719–20 . 
59 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).  




employees,”60 or “generally inform[ ] the citizenry of public events and 
occurrences.”61 
The Court presumes a desire by individual information consumers to dig 
deeply into “the qualifications and performance” of those who hold 
office62 and a thirst for information that will “serve as a powerful antidote 
to any abuses of power by governmental officials” and “keep[ ] officials 
elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were 
selected to serve.”63 
A “basic assumption,” the Court notes, is that this accountability-seeking 
audience “will often serve as an important restraint on government.”64 
Knowing that this audience is attentive will curb the impulses of 
government leaders and motivate them to be “responsive to the will of the 
people.”65 Likewise, the people, the Court assumes, will actively acquire 
knowledge for the purpose of changing the way they vote, the policies 
they support, and the demands they make.66 Because of this particular 
pattern of truthseeking, the “free flow of information to the public” will 
“insure nothing less than democratic decisionmaking,”67 making possible 
“remedial action in the conduct of public business”68 and “unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.”69  
 
Crucially, the Court’s assumed audience wants this watchdog information 
universally—and is willing and able to accept and act upon bad news 
about its initially preferred candidate. Even if the citizens once supported 
the government official, they will want a continued flow of accurate and 
useful information about him or her, whether positive or negative. The 
cases speak of press consumers needing “full information in respect of the 
                                                
60 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539. 
61 Id.; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (referencing “the paramount 
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials”). 
62 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. 
63 Mills, 384 U.S. at 219. 
64 Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585. 
65 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
66 Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“Without the information provided by the press most of us and 
many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently . . . .”); Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 273: (describing people using the press for “effective criticism”); Branzburg, 408 
U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating the free press should serve “to insure nothing 
less than democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of information to the 
public.”). 
67 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
68 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8. 
69 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 




doings or misdoings of their government”70 and information needed “to 
applaud or to criticize”71 government performance. 
 
The Court sees the press audience member as someone who hopes not 
merely to have information with which she already agrees or that would 
make her comfortable about past choices.72 The Court characterizes 
audiences as willingly reading about or viewing some matters that are 
unpleasant to or unpopular with those audiences or that express views with 
which those audiences might disagree. The assumption is that desired 
information will include news of “political conduct and views which some 
respectable people approve, and others condemn,”73 and that the audience 
will want “unpopular views on public affairs.”74 The Court envisions 
citizens seeking completeness of information and sources of truth, 
whatever their predispositions or partisan priors. It imagines informed 
democratic citizens who are accountability-seeking and will actively 
assess the work of government and hold it responsible for necessary 
change. 
 
All told, the United States Supreme Court characterizes audiences of the 
press as active, focused fact-seekers on a range of hard, important topics. 
It unreservedly embraces The Truthseeking Assumption. 
2. The Rational-Processing Assumption  
The Supreme Court’s press-freedom jurisprudence not only envisions an 
audience that seeks after factual truth; it also envisions one that is made up 
of people who rationally process that information when it is provided to 
them. The assumption is of a press audience member who has the capacity 
to competently digest information in deliberative, analytical ways that lead 
her to a working understanding of objective facts. The Court is assuming a 
citizen reader with sufficient devotion, mental energy, and cognitive 
resources to tussle with and to process competing threads of information. 
The Court’s repeatedly suggests that readers and listeners are utilizing 
their processing skills to achieve “understanding,” “comprehension,” 75 
and even “enlightenment” on the issues. Indeed, the Court often speaks of 
                                                
70 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added). 
71 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Barr v. 
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Black, J., concurring)) (describing a desire for coverage 
that goes beyond being  “a captive mouthpiece of newsmakers”) 
72 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
73 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (1964). 
74 Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring). 
75 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (noting the press is central to “public 
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire 
criminal justice system”); Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(same). 




press audience members’ capacity to exercise “enlightened choice,”76 and 
to become an “enlightened citizenry,” 77 acting on “an informed and 
enlightened public opinion.” 
This enlightened press audience found in the jurisprudence is capable of 
“intelligently form[ing] opinions”78 and developing “informed and 
critical” judgments.79 More fundamentally, the press-freedom 
jurisprudence, like the First Amendment itself, “presupposes that right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues.”80 The presumption is that some conclusions will be objectively 
right and that press audiences, armed with both mental capacity and 
mental energy, will use new information to generate thoughtful opinions 
and reach correct conclusions. 
The Court’s assumed press audience possesses judgment, logic, and the 
reasoning skills to take in information, mull it over, work with it, and 
process it logically. The Court’s depiction information consumers is 
punctuated by decidedly active cognitive verbs: the audience members are 
“canvassing,”81 “examining,”82 and “criticizing.”83 They are “bringing 
critical judgment to bear on public affairs.”84 Thus, press freedom is 
rooted in a belief in “the triumphs which have been gained by reason and 
humanity over error and oppression”85 and “in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion.”86  
The Court’s assumed audience will also take the time to engage the facts 
and ideas presented—getting to work on wrestling with the material and 
                                                
76 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Enlightened choice by an 
informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised . . . .”). 
77 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the press 
needed a wide swath of protection for its work because “the only effective restraint upon 
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may 
lie in an enlightened citizenry”). 
78 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8. 
79 Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J. concurring). 
80 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
81 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 (1964) (“[T]he press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the 
merits and measures of public men, of every description . . . .”) 
82 Id. at 274 (“[T]he right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon . . . .”). 
83 Shepherd v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (describing how press “guards against 
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting” the judicial process to “public scrutiny and 
criticism.”). 
84 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984). 
85 Near, 283 U.S. at 783. 
86 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (stating that the founders “believe[d] in the power of reason 
as applied through public discussion”) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S at 259 (White, J., 
concurring) (same). 




honing it through discussion87 and debate.88 Government regulation of the 
press must be resisted precisely because it risks “impoverish[ing]” the 
rich, complex “public dialogue” the Court envisions.89  
Moreover, this envisioned press audience does not stop at talk. The 
Supreme Court’s consumer of press coverage has the cognitive 
wherewithal to turn knowledge into working knowledge and to turn 
working knowledge into thoughtful, contemplative action. Audience 
members are said to employ information to perform plainly deliberative 
tasks—to “vote intelligently,” 90  to “enhance the integrity” of 
proceedings,91 to “clamor for change,”92 to “resolve issues,”93 to “propose 
remedies,”94 to “cope with the exigencies”95 of the day, and, as discussed 
in more detail below, to “hold accountable” those in power.  
Unquestionably, then, the U.S. Supreme Court assumes that individual 
information consumers in the marketplace of ideas are engaging their 
cognitive faculties to process the information they take in. They can weigh 
                                                
87 See, e.g., Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a 
major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (“[F]ree discussion of governmental 
affairs.”); Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 720 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting we have 
a “free press” “in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion”); 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281 (“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss 
the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages.”) (quoting Coleman v. 
MacLennon, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)); id. at 264 (describing the “maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion”). 
88 Near, 283 U.S. at 718-19 (emphasizing that public officers[’] character and conduct 
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press). 
89 Branzburg, 408 U.S.  at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Thus, we cannot escape the 
conclusion that when neither the reporter nor his source can rely on the shield of 
confidentiality against unrestrained use of the grand jury's subpoena power, valuable 
information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be 
impoverished.”). 
90 Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (“[T]o vote intelligently or to register opinions on the 
administration of government generally.”); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280–81 
(“[W]here an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of 
giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for 
public office and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more 
intelligently . . . .”) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennon, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)). 
91 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578 (Media . . . presence has historically been 
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place [in the trial courtroom].”) 
(footnote omitted). 
92 See Mills, 384 U.S. at 219  (“Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize 
governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of 
the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected 
to improve our society and keep it free.”) 
93 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 738 (“One main function of the First Amendment is to ensure 
ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve public issues.”) (quoting 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)). 
94 Id. at 269 (noting that “that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . .”) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76  
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
95 See, e.g., Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 (noting that press freedom is necessary to “enable 
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”) 




values, compare competing data, and deal with volumes of sometimes 
complex and often contradictory information. They can be trusted to reach 
correct conclusions. 
3. The Updating Assumption 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s press freedom jurisprudence anticipates a 
press audience that is capable of updating information. The cases 
repeatedly make clear that the Court assumes that the press audience 
member will challenge her previous views and will update her knowledge, 
opinions, and beliefs when provided with contrary information. 
The assumed press audience consists of people who are not only willing to 
accept but regularly affirmatively demand counterspeech96—additional 
information that questions or refutes news coverage that was previously 
received. Most press-freedom cases have the unspoken thesis that this 
counterspeech is anticipated, expected, and welcomed by individual 
information consumers.97 The Court’s depictions often include references 
to a desire to have “the fullest flow of information”98 and not to be 
“fettered”99 by outdated or incorrect communications.  
Beyond this, the Court assumes that as the press audience member 
receives this continued flow of full, unfettered information, she will use it 
to test, modify, or improve her previously held views that are inconsistent 
with the newer data. The prototypical press audience member is, the Court 
tells us, “scrutinizing”100 facts, people, and situations in order to hone 
opinions and revise assessments. 
Indeed, the press-freedom cases take as a given not only that audiences 
will be craving coverage that “contradict[s],” 101  “counteract[s],” 102 
“correct[s],”103 or “rebut[s]”104 preexisting information, but also that this 
new information will fix previous thinking by audiences, who will rework 
their understanding of the particular matters.  
                                                
96  See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Press and the Expectation of Executive 
Counterspeech, 83 MO. L. REV. 939, 942–43 (2019). 
97 Id. at 942. 
98 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
99 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (noting that “to allow [a free press] to be fettered is to fetter 
ourselves”). 
100 See, e.g., Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (describing the press as “bring[ing] to bear the 
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”) (citation 
omitted); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (describing how press 
coverage “guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, 
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”). 
101 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Butts, 388 U.S. at 143. 




The Court’s press-freedom case law in the libel context particularly 
embraces this assumption. The doctrinal structure, which centers on a 
threshold distinction between plaintiffs who are private figures and those 
who are public ones,105 does so on the assumption that the latter have 
greater access to opportunities to offer corrective information to press 
audiences than the former.106 It is assumed that this access amounts to 
audience exposure and that audience exposure will lead to audience 
updating: “The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—
using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error.” 107  
Although the Court acknowledges that it can be complicated to unring a 
bell,108 the Justices in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny are able 
to conclude that those with “ready access … to mass media of 
communication” can “counter criticism of their views and activities”109 —
and that “sufficient access to the means of counterargument”110 will allow 
these individuals to “expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies 
of the defamatory statements”111—because they assume an updating 
audience: an audience capable of revising its prior views based on the new 
information counterargument provides.  
The press-freedom model embraced by the Court is that “counterargument 
and education are the weapons available to expose” misstatements112—
that “speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, and 
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.”113 
This model is workable only on the assumption that audience members are 
open to receiving replacement information and are capable of executing 
that replacing. 
 B. The Gap Between Supreme Court Assumptions and the Reality of 
Press Audiences 
The Supreme Court’s core assumptions about press audiences—the 
Truthseeking Assumption, the Rational-Processing Assumption, and the 
Updating Assumption— are largely undercut by a wide and growing body 
of literature in behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, social 
psychology about human desires, capacities, and behavior when 
interacting with the world of information. Part 1 of this section examines 
the ways in which that research makes plain that the Court is operating on 
                                                
105 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at n. 9 (“Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of 
defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the 
truth rarely catches up with a lie.”); Jones, Executive Counterspeech, supra note 96, at 
958. 
109 Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) 
110 Id. at 155. 
111 Id. (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S.	at	377 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
112 Id. (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962)). 
113 Butts, 388 U.S. at 153 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)). 




false premises. Part 2 then considers two additional factors that may be 
exacerbating and widening the gap between these Supreme Court 
assumptions and on-the-ground reality of press audiences in the current 
moment:  growing hyperpartisanship, and a changing information 
landscape that increasingly enables “filter bubbles” and ideological 
segregation in news consumption.  On every front, the Court’s thinking 
about press audiences is deeply flawed. 
 
 
1. Social Science Research Demonstrating the Flaws in the 
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions 
 
As described in Part III.A, the Supreme Court often assumes that press 
consumers are strongly motivated to seek out facts on important public 
matters that will help them have a more accurate view of the world around 
them. There is little doubt, of course, that many citizens, in many 
circumstances do, in fact, desire, seek out, process, and act upon empirical 
truth. However, it turns out that the desire for accurate information is but 
one of many motivations—some conscious and many more 
subconscious114—that shape and drive the ways that people seek out and 
process information. Indeed, research has identified a whole host of other 
important and perhaps more dominant motivations that shape information-
seeking and processing, including (1) conserving cognitive resources; (2) 
expressing and protecting group identity, including cultural and political 
identity; and (3) managing threats and uncertainty. These discoveries have 
fundamentally reshaped how scientists understand the ways people 
interact with information and evaluate the world around them. Taken 
together, this research reveals significant flaws in the Court’s 
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions. 
 
 
a. Conserving Cognitive Resources 
   
Early models of human behavior and decision-making in economics, 
sociology, and other fields often treated individuals as “rational actors,” 
who use the information available to them to calculate the expected utility 
of various options and to make optimal decisions that best satisfy their 
own preferences.115  Over time, this “notion of rationality as 
optimization”116 was challenged by the idea of “bounded rationality,” 
                                                
114 For simplicity, we will refer to “motivations” here, although the identified motivations 
are perhaps more properly described as factors that influence and shape decisionmaking 
processes. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, 
and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. LAW REV. 1, 19 (2011). 
115 Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality 1, 3 in BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, eds.2002); 
Thomas Vilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, 
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds. 2002)  [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES ] 1, 1. 
116 See Gigerenzer & Selten, supra note 115, at 3. 




proposed by Herbert Simon, which suggests that because people have 
limited time, information, and cognitive resources (like attention), people 
actually make decisions not by optimizing (“calculating utilities and 
probabilities”)117 but instead by relying on much simpler rules about when 
to stop searching for additional information and how to make ultimate 
decisions.118  
 
Building on this insight, in the early 1970s, cognitive psychologist Amos 
Tversky and psychologist and economist Daniel Kahneman identified and 
described a series of heuristics—mental short-cuts or “rules of 
thumb”119—that people employ to make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. While the heuristics themselves are “sensible estimation 
procedures” that “draw on underlying processes. . . that are highly 
sophisticated,”120 the resulting judgments are biased—that is, they depart 
from “normative rational theory” in predictable ways.121 
 
Of course, people do not always act as “cognitive misers,”122 who hoard 
their cognitive resources and limit cognitive expenditures whenever 
possible. In later work, Kahneman distinguished between two distinct 
modes of decisionmaking, which he termed System 1 and System 2. 
System 1 “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and 
no sense of voluntary control,” whereas System 2 “allocates attention to 
the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations.”123  System 1, then, is the realm of quick, automatic 
judgments, where “quick and dirty”124 heuristics hold primary sway.  
System 2, in contrast, is slower and more deliberate—the “effortful 
system”125 that  we “identify [as our] conscious, reasoning self that has 
beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to 
do.”126  System 2 is typically mobilized when we are surprised by events 
or data that don’t conform to our normal expectations or by questions for 
which System 1 doesn’t yield a quick answer.127 We also use System 2 to 
“monitor” our “own behavior”128 and to exert self-control over the 
                                                
117 Id. at 8.  
118 Id. at 8 (noting that there are “three classes of processes that models of bounded 
rationality typically specify:  “[s]imple search rules,”(how to search) “[s]imple stopping 
rules,” (when to stop searching) and “[s]imple decision rules” (how to decide)).    
119 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 7 (2011). 
120 Gilovich & Griffin, supra note 115, at 3. 
121 Id. at 2-3. 
122 The term “cognitive misers” was coined by Professors Susan Fiske & Shelley Taylor 
to convey the notion that “people are limited in their capacity to process information, so 
they take shortcuts whenever they can.” SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL 
COGNITION 11-12 (1984). 
123 KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 20-21. 
124 Id. at 25. 
125 Id. at 29. 
126 Id. at 21. 
127 Id. at 24. 
128 Id. at 24. 




“impulses” generated by System 1.129  Other researchers have articulated 
similar “‘dual process theories’ of thinking, knowing, and information 
processing.”130 
This “division of labor”131 between Systems 1 and 2, with System 1 doing 
the bulk of decision-making, works because heuristics typically work—or 
at least work well enough for the majority of situations and decisions. The 
use of heuristics is both adaptive and, in many respects, fully rational 
given limited time, energy, information, and cognitive resources.132 
Heuristics do, however, result in predictable biases and systemic errors in 
information processing. The following discussion considers several 
heuristics and biases that have particularly important consequences for 
individual’s interest in and capacity to process information on matters 
critical to public policy and government affairs.  
 
i. The Availability Heuristic 
 
When people make a judgment about how likely a particular risk is to 
come to fruition—and thus about how important and serious a particular 
societal problem is—they tend to base that judgment on how easily they 
can call to mind instances of that problem occurring.133 Thus, those 
judgments may turn less on how often that risk has actually come to pass 
and more on how “available” or mentally accessible examples of that risk 
occurring are; availability, in turn, is influenced by how salient, vivid, and 
recent (and thus how memorable) those instances are,134 which in turn may 
be influenced by media coverage and public discussion of those events.135 
Indeed, Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran have also suggested that the 
“availability errors” generated by this heuristic can be transmitted quickly 
and compounded through an “availability cascade”—a “self-reinforcing 
process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception 
triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility 
through its rising availability in public discourse.”136 
  
The availability heuristic may help explain why, for example, parents tend 
to overestimate the risk of stranger kidnappings. It also helps explain, in 
part, why people who have very divergent media consumption patterns 
may develop quite divergent views about how likely or important 
particular problems are, if those problems are covered with differing 
frequency, attention, or vividness in their preferred media streams. 
                                                
129 Id. at 26. 
130 Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 115, at 
397, 398. 
131 KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 25. 
132 See, e.g. Gigerenzer & Selten, supra at 9. 
133 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 122, at 1124. 
134 See id. at 1124-25. 
135 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STANFORD L. REV. 683, 683 (1998). 
136 See id. 





ii. The Affect Heuristic 
 
While there are many different accounts of the role of emotion in decision-
making, one influential account is the “affect heuristic.” Affect describes a 
feeling, whether conscious or subconscious, that something is good or 
bad.137 Particularly when System 1 is generating decisions,138 those 
feelings can then influence judgments and decisionmaking.139 In 
particular, research suggests that people are inclined to judge an activity as 
low-risk and high-benefit if they like that activity, and conversely as high-
risk and low-benefit if they dislike that activity.140  Similarly, those risks 
that evoke a feeling of dread (such as cancer) are perceived as more 
serious than those that do not.141 
 
 
iii. Loss Aversion and Framing Effects 
 
Tvserky and Kahneman’s Nobel-Prize-winning prospect theory 
demonstrates that people tend to care more about losses than equivalent 
gains—that is, the disutility associated with a particular loss exceeds the 
utility associated with an equivalent gain.142 This “loss aversion” drives a 
number of observed heuristics, including “status quo bias”—a “preference 
for the current state” of things.143  
 
Moreover, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics research also 
demonstrates that differences in the way a question is framed can have 
significant effects on our judgments. The combination of framing effects 
and loss aversion means that the amount of money people are willing to 
spend to address a particular risk turns, to some extent, on whether the 
pay-off is presented through a positive or negative frame (e.g., lives saved 
v. lives lost).144  People are generally willing to spend more to reduce 
fatalities when the issue is framed as preventing deaths rather than saving 
                                                
137 Slovic et al., supra note 130, at 397, 397. 
138 Because “[a]ffective responses occur rapidly and automatically,” they are often 
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139 Id. at 400. 
140 Id. at 410-12. 
141 Id. at 410. Closely related to the affect heuristic is George Loewenstein’s “risk-as-
feelings hypothesis,” which suggests that when “emotional reactions to risky situations . . 
. diverge” from “cognitive assessments,” “emotional reactions often drive behavior.” 
George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 267, 267 
(2001).   
142 See id. 
143 Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 
5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 193 (1991). It also explains the “endowment effect,” in 
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pay to acquire” it. Id. 
144 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 




livings.145 More generally, whether an issue is framed in terms of negative 
or positive impacts can affect the kind of solutions that seem appealing 
and appropriate.146  
 
*    *    * 
 
All told, the behavioral research on conserving cognitive resources casts 
doubt on the Court’s assumptions that American press audiences actively 
seek out truth, rationally process facts, and readily update mistaken 
assumptions. Our bounded rationality limits both our capacity and desire 
to seek out and filter the seemingly boundless information available on 
every policy issue. The desire to conserve cognitive resources and avoid 
information overload limits a press audience member’s motivation to seek 
out and process empirical facts. Indeed, doing so may be a quite rational 
response in many circumstances.  Moreover, reliance on simple heuristics 
to conserve mental resources, while rational and useful in a wide variety 
of circumstances, also affects press audience’s processing of the 
information they do receive. These heuristics result in systemic bias that 
causes press audience members to, for example, judge the importance of 
problems based on whether they can conjure up vivid, salient examples of 
that risk, to base their assessment of the costs and benefits of an activity 
on how much they like that activity, and to be biased toward the status quo 
and against taking measures that risk losses.   
One might conclude from the preceding discussion that problems with 
human cognition can be mitigated, at least in some instances, by 
encouraging people to actively engage System 2, deliberative thinking 
when evaluating evidence about significant societal problems. And, 
indeed, research suggests that when accuracy-motivations come to the 
forefront, people “expend more cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning, 
attend to relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply, 
often using more complex rules.”147 Conserving cognitive resources is not, 
however, the only motivation that competes with accuracy-seeking.148    
 
b. Expressing and Protecting Cultural and Political Identity 
 
                                                
145 See id. 
146 See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
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of vaccination—are framed in positive or negative terms can have “profound effects on 
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147 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 480, 
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148 See, e.g., Hart et al., Feeling Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of 
Selective Exposure to Information, 135 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 555 (2009) 
(describing the competition between the accuracy goal and the goal of defending one’s 
preexisting views and noting that “information choices are meant to fulfill goals to 
defend attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and to accurately appraise and represent reality”). 




Even when we engage our deliberative faculties, truth isn’t always the 
primary objective we pursue. Empirical evidence suggests that people 
often engage in “motivated reasoning”:  “the unconscious tendency . . .  to 
process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to 
the formation of accurate beliefs.”149 Often, motivated reasoning involves 
seeking out or processing new data in ways that conform to one’s 
preexisting beliefs150 (so-called “confirmation bias”).151 While motivated 
reasoning can influence System 1 thinking, its influence on System 2 
thinking may be at least as profound.152 Indeed, engaging in motivated 
reasoning is often thought to require the expenditure of cognitive 
resources: cognitive resources must be marshaled to counter-argue or 
otherwise justify dismissal or discounting of information contrary to our 
desired result153 (so-called “disconfirmation bias”).154 
 
Recent research suggests that one of the primary goals of motivated 
reasoning is the expression and protection of group identity—such as 
one’s cultural or political identity. Thus, one prominent manifestation of 
motivated reasoning is cultural cognition, which “refers to the tendency of 
individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . .  to 
values that define their cultural identities.”155  Studies of a host of 
                                                
149 Kahan, supra note 114, at 19 (2011).  
150 See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail, 32 POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR 303, 307 (2010) (observing that “people tend to display bias in evaluating 
political arguments and evidence, favoring those that reinforce their exiting views and 
disparaging those that contradict their views”); C.S. Taber & M. Lodge, Motivated 
Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 755, 756 
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36 POLIT. BEHAV. 235, 237 (2014).    
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(System 1) can be expected to be even more adept at using technical information and 
complex analysis to bolster group-congenial beliefs.”). 
153 See, e.g., Brian F. Schaffner & Cameron Roche, Misinformation and Motivated 
Reasoning: Responses to Economic News in a Politicized Environment, 81 PUBLIC 
OPINION QUARTERLY 86, 88 (2016) (“Motivated reasoning is a process in which an 
individual makes an active, cognitive effort to ‘arrive at a particular conclusion’”) 
(quoting Kunda, supra note 147).  
154 Bolsen, supra note 151, at 237. 
155 The Cultural Cognition Project, http://www.culturalcognition.net/, last visited March 
18, 2019. More specifically, cultural cognition theory maps people’s worldviews along 
two axes: “hierarchy-egalitarianism” and “individualism-communitarianism,” Kahan et 
al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RESEARCH 147, 151 (2011), 
and posits that an array of psychological mechanisms (including motivated reasoning and 
the availability and affect heuristics) will cause people’s assessments of risks to align 
with their worldviews. Id. at 148. 




controversial and disputed social issues—including climate change,156 
nanotechnology,157 HPV vaccination,158 the death penalty,159 nuclear 
power,160 and gun control161—suggest that individuals, often 
unconsciously, “selectively . . . credit or dismiss evidence of risk” based 
on cultural values.162 The result is quite divergent (sometimes 
“diametrically opposed”) risk perceptions across cultural divides.163 
Interestingly, expertise, education, and increased scientific literacy and 
numeracy can amplify rather than diminish this polarization, perhaps 
because expertise and education may simply be additional cognitive 
resources that can be mobilized to serve the goals of motivated 
reasoning.164   
 
Recent research likewise suggests that protecting one’s political identity is 
another important motivation that influences the way that people seek out 
and process information. A study of motivated reasoning in the context of 
mathematical reasoning found that Republicans were more likely to 
correctly answer a math-story problem about the effect of a handgun ban 
on crime when the correct answer aligned with their presumed political 
priors—that gun control measures increase, rather than decrease crime—
whereas Democrats were more likely to answer correctly when the data 
showed that the handgun ban decreased crime.165 This “motivated 
numeracy effect” was stronger among high-numeracy individuals (those 
with greater mathematical skills) than among low-numeracy 
individuals.166  
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Underlying motivations for these forms of “identity-protective 
cognition”167 might include minimizing cognitive dissonance that might 
result from crediting facts that challenge one’s worldview,168 “protecti[ng] 
social standing” in one’s cultural group,169 and expressing support for that 
group and its members.170 Whatever the precise reason, it seems clear that 
people are often motivated to seek out and process information in ways 
that express, affirm, and protect their preexisting political and cultural 
identities. 
 
Moreover, motivated reasoning results not just in “biased assimilation”171 
of facts, but also in “biased search”172 or “selective exposure.”173 That is, 
people engaged in identity-protective cognition are not seeking out what is 
“true,” but rather are seeking out information that confirms, rather than 
challenges, their existing beliefs, and worldviews.174  Research on media 
consumption preferences and habits demonstrates that party affiliation and 
political preferences do, indeed, drive media choices.175 One study of 2004 
data found, for example, that a “substantial proportion of the public  . . 
consumes media sharing their political predispositions.176  
                                                
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 149; Dustin Carnahan et al., Candidate Vulnerability and Exposure to 
Counterattitudinal Information: Evidence from Two U.S. Presidential Elections, HUMAN 
COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 1, 10 (2016) (noting that “dissonance theory remains the 
preeminent explanation of selective exposure”). 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., Schaffner & Roche, supra note 153, at 87-88 (describing the potential for 
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171Kahan, supra note 114, at 21.   
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COMMUNICATIONS 680, 680 (2014).  
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Garrett & Stroud, supra note 173, at 681-82. Some researchers contend that “biased 
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counterattitudinal information), while other researchers treat selective approach and 
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Recent data confirm these partisan divides in media preferences. A 2014 
Pew Research study found that “[w]hen it comes to getting news about 
government and politics, there are stark ideological differences in the 
sources that online Americans use, as well as in their awareness of and 
trust in these sources.”177 Nearly half of conservatives identify Fox News 
“as their main source for news about government and politics.” 178 
Although there is no dominant media outlet identified by liberals, “liberals 
are more than twice as likely as web-using adults overall to name NPR 
(13% vs. 5%), MSNBC (12% VS. 4%), and the New York Times (10% vs. 
3%) as their top source for political news.”179  
Motivated reasoning may also have particularly significant consequences 
for the Court’s assumptions that people will eagerly update their factual 
conclusions and beliefs. Indeed, research suggests that people’s views on 
factual questions are “sticky”: even when confronted directly with new 
information that contradicts their current beliefs, people are reticent to 
significantly revise or “update” their view of the facts.180  
Reluctance to update has been the focus of significant recent attention, 
with widely circulated reports suggesting not only that people don’t update 
but that efforts to encourage updating result in a so-called “backfire 
effect,” in which their erroneous views become even more entrenched.181 
The “backfire effect” quickly became part of the arsenal of those arguing 
mostly strenuously that we are now in a Post-Truthism era.  If attempts to 
correct people’s basic factual misperceptions on questions critical to 
public policy are not only sometimes unsuccessful but often actually 
counterproductive—causing people to “double down” 182  on mistaken 
factual judgments that support their ideological views—then constructive, 
deliberate political debate seems a pipedream indeed.  
Later research, however, casts doubt on the strength of these findings—
and, in particular, has failed to replicate the backfire effect in other 
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http://djflynn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/elusive-backfire-effect-wood-porter.pdf.   




experimental contexts.183  Nonetheless, a recent collaborative study on the 
effect of fact-checking on people’s factual beliefs conducted by the 
authors of the original backfire study and their primary critics concluded 
that, even in the absence of backfire, there is a “widespread evidence of 
motivated reasoning” in the processing and updating of factual beliefs, 
citing prior findings that “for approximately 80% of issues tested, 
responsiveness to corrective information varied by ideology.” 184  
Moreover, the authors noted that while the current study results showed no 
evidence of backfire and indicated at least some participant capacity to 
update,185 the study confirmed those earlier findings by documenting 
motivated-reasoning effects in the form of “differential acceptance”—in 
which the extent of updating depended on people’s political priors (and 
thus whether the fact-check was responding to pro- or counter-attitudinal 
facts) on some of the tested factual claims.186  
 
Accordingly, while the jury is still out on the precise extent and 
mechanisms by which motivated reasoning limits factual updating on 
controversial facts with high political salience, the evidence suggests that 
we are at least somewhat reluctant to update our preexisting factual views 
because we are motivated to protect our cultural and political identities. 
Press audiences’ preexisting views on factual questions critical to 
important public policy debates are thus likely to be “sticky,” and the most 
recent research indicates that while we may not be “fact-immune,” we are 
probably quite “fact-resistant.”187  
c. Managing Threats and Uncertainty 
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Research also reveals that human information seeking and processing are 
not merely driven by a need for accuracy, but motivated by a deep need to 
manage threat and uncertainty. Like other fields of social science, social 
psychology and, particularly, social cognition,188 suggest a variety of 
factors, beyond simple empirical truth, that shape the ways that people 
seek out and interpret data about the social world they inhabit.  
 
As with other cognitive models, the dominant social-cognition models of 
the “social thinker” 189  have evolved over time from hypothesizing 
“consistency seekers motivated by [reducing] perceived discrepancies 
among their cognitions”190 to “naïve scientists” who employ “attribution 
theories” to “explain their own and other people’s behavior” 191  to 
“cognitive misers” who “take shortcuts” to minimize demands on their 
limited cognitive capacities192 to “motivated tacticians” who select and 
cycle among various cognitive strategies to suit their needs and desires in 
particular contexts,193 to “activated actors” who rely primarily on rapid 
“unconscious associations” that “cue associated cognitions.”194 Each of 
these models continues, however, to explain important aspects of social 
cognition.195 
 
Many of the motivations recognized by social cognition research echo or 
mirror those of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology more 
generally. For example, the needs for “belonging,” “shared social 
understandings,” and “in-group trust”196 might be seen as corollaries of the 
desire to protect and express one’s group identity discussed above. Other 
motivations, such as the desire to see one’s self positively (“self-
enhancement”)197 and to exert control over “outcomes that depend on 
other people,”198 are perhaps more prominent in social cognition than in 
other fields.  
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Several theories in social cognition suggest that managing threats199—to 
one’s life, way of life, and the status quo—is likewise an important 
motivation that influences cognition. For example, “mortality salience,” a 
focus on one’s own death “makes people cherish worldview that will 
outlive them.”200 In other words, people who feel threatened “validate the 
ideologies of their salient group identities.  Under threat, conservatives 
want to conserve, and progressives want to progress,”201 and both groups 
incline to “strong leaders, who reduce apparent uncertainty.”202 Similarly, 
terror management theory posits that people cope with salient reminders of 
their own mortality “by identifying with their ingroups, which will outlive 
them,”203 and striking out against outgroups.204 
Another potential method for managing uncertainty is engaging in 
essentialist thinking about the “other,” because doing so helps people feel 
more confident in their ability to predict events and to understand others’ 
behavior.  This tendency is exemplified by the “fundamental attribution 
error,” the “most commonly documented bias in social perception,”205 in 
which people ascribe others’ behavior or circumstances to their fixed 
traits, rather than acknowledging the role that “situational forces” play in 
shaping that person’s behavior and life circumstances. 206  Thus, if 
something terrible happens to someone in an outgroup, we tend to assume 
it is because they are a “bad” person rather than because they are in a bad 
situation, whereas we tend to assume the opposite when bad things happen 
to ourselves or to people with whom we easily relate. We thus tend to be 
far less charitable in our assessments of people who are not like us.  
A more controversial theory, known as system justification theory, 
suggests that both advantaged and disadvantaged groups are inclined to 
“legitimate the status quo,”207 particularly when the system is threatened 
or attacked.208  System justification is not always activated, but when it is, 
people are inclined to “more favorable attitudes toward the system than” 
the evidence supports209 and may further these attitudes by engaging 
strategies like rationalization and victim-blaming.210 System justification 
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can serve “multiple needs, including epistemic and existential needs to 
manage uncertainty and threat,” promote “order, structure, and closure,” 
and decrease “emotional distress associated with social inequality.”211 
All together, this body of literature suggests strongly that motives like 
managing uncertainty and threat compete heavily with accuracy 
motivations in human information seeking and information processing. 
*** 
The social science evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
Truthseeking, Rational-Processing, and Updating Assumptions are deeply 
flawed.  The empirical evidence makes clear that people have a wide 
variety of motivations other than truthseeking, including preserving 
cognitive resources, expressing and protecting cultural and political 
identity, and managing threats and uncertainty.   
Moreover, whether engaging the rapid, automatic decisionmaking 
associated with System 1 or the slower, more deliberate decisionmaking 
that characterizes System 2 reasoning, people often process information in 
biased ways. Most strikingly, motivated reasoning—often designed to 
protect one’s cultural or political identity—means that press audiences 
will tend to process information in ways that confirm their preexisting 
views and that otherwise conform to their cultural commitments or 
political priors.  
Likewise, people face significant barriers to rationally updating their prior 
beliefs. The same phenomena that hamstring a press audience in seeking 
and processing truth—bounded rationality, motivating reasoning, and 
identity-protective cognition—all suggest that once press audience 
members have processed information about matters of public concern and 
come to a conclusion about what the underlying facts are, those factual 
judgments will be difficult to dislodge 
 
2. Current Exacerbating Factors  
 
Cognitive limitations have always had implications for theories of 
democracy, 212  the First Amendment, 213  and transparency. 214  Likewise, 
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citizens have often lacked basic factual knowledge about current affairs 
and thus used cues like political affiliation to decide which candidates and 
policies to support. 215 But these longstanding truths about cognitive 
limitations and mental shortcuts seem to be exacerbated today by 
additional factors that are arguably unique to this particular Post-Truthism 
moment. New research from the fields of political science and 
communications highlights the concrete ways in which our cognitive 
limitations and biases are being amplified by the confluence of two 
sweeping and mutually-reinforcing societal phenomena: hyper-
partisanship and the shifting information landscape. These factors further 





Partisanship is, of course, nothing new. Nonetheless, levels of partisanship 
are on the rise and significantly higher than in the recent past.  In 2014, the 
Director of Political Research at the Pew Research Center declared, 
“Political polarization is the defining feature of early 21st century 
American politics, both among the public and elected officials.”216 This 
pronouncement was grounded in a 2014 Pew Research report that found 
“Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines— 
and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in 
the last two decades.”217 The area of policy agreement between Democrats 
and Republicans has shrunk considerably over those decades, as 
Republicans have shifted to the right and Democrats have shifted to the 
left. This polarization means that, as of 2014, “92% of Republicans are to 
the right of the median (middle) Democrat, compared with 64%” in 1994, 
and “94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican,” 
compared with 70% in 1994.218 The same deepening polarization is also 
                                                                                                                     
“research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics shows that humans operate 
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evident in Congress, which by some metrics is “now more polarized than 
at any time since the end of Reconstruction.” 219  
 
As cultural cognition and identity-protective cognition predict, 
Republicans and Democrats are divided today not just on policy, but on 
facts.  Ironically, one of the few things on which Republicans and 
Democrats readily agree is that they fundamentally disagree about many 
basic facts.220  
 
This perception is borne out by public opinion polls that document a stark 
partisan factual divide on an extensive array of important factual issues. 
For example, in 2018, three-quarters of those who lean Democrat agreed 
that “the Earth is warming primarily due to human causes,” whereas only 
about one-quarter of Republicans concurred.221 Similarly, in 2016, nearly 
three-quarters of Democrats believed unemployment had decreased during 
the Obama administration, but—again—only one-quarter of Republicans 
agreed.222 About two-third of Republicans believed Obama had deported 
fewer undocumented immigrants than President Bush, “but less than half 
of Democrats” agreed.223 In some respects the breadth and depth of these 
factual divides should not be surprising: in an increasingly partisan world, 
almost every issue is politicized, 224  which activates “motivated 
reasoning”—and creates deep partisan divides—on many more factual 
issues than would otherwise be the case. 
 
Unfortunately, many Republicans and Democrats today don’t simply 
disagree with each other: increasingly, they also disdain, demonize, 
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disparage, and even dehumanize each other.225  In 2016, poll data showed 
that about half of Republicans and Democrats were “afraid” of the 
opposing party. 226  More than one-third of Democrats described 
Republicans as more “dishonest,” “immoral,” and “unintelligent” than 
other Americans.227 Conversely, almost half of Republicans described 
Democrats as more “immoral,” “dishonest,” and “lazy.”228 A 2017 survey 
found that “nearly 20 percent of Democrats and Republicans say that 
many members of the other side ‘lack the traits to be considered fully 
human,’” and “[e]ven more chilling,” “about 15 percent of Republicans 
and 20 percent of Democrats agree that the country would be ‘better off if 
large numbers of opposing partisans in the public today ‘just died.’”229  
 
Additionally, a 2018 survey found that “45 percent of Democrats and 35 
percent of Republicans” would be “unhappy if their child married 
someone from the opposite party (up from about 5 percent for both groups 
in 1960).230 And, indeed, “[s]ince 1973, the rate of politically mixed 
marriages in America has declined by 50 percent.”231  That decline, in 
turn, may further deepen the partisan divide, as people in politically mixed 
marriages—and, importantly, their children—tend to be more politically 
moderate.232  
 
For some significant portion of Republicans and Democrats, then, party 
affiliation is seen as a reliable enough proxy for humanity in both of the 
important senses of that word: are you deserving of dignity and being 
treated as fully human (or can I legitimately treat you as fundamentally 
other) and are you humane (or can I legitimately view you as lacking basic 
decency). Presumably, these two judgments are, at least in some respects, 
inextricably linked. And, interestingly, it is “white, urban, older, highly 
educated, politically engaged, and politically segregated” Americans who 
are mostly likely to answer no to these questions when judging members 
of the other political party and to express disdain and contempt for those 
on the “other side.” 233  As described above, especially in times of 
perceived threat, this “othering” can intensify group identification and 
make it easier not only to discount or dismiss opposing views but to justify 
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retreat into ideological silos that enable people to avoid engaging people 
with whom they disagree.  Moreover, the affect heuristic and motivated 
reasoning both suggest that when people “other” those with whom they 
disagree, they will be more inclined to accept misinformation that falsely 
suggests that their opponents are unreasonable, malicious, or even 
dangerous.234 
    
While it is possible that the partisan factual divides are not as quite 
intractable and stark as they appear, 235 deepening partisanship is a factor 
that unquestionably undergirds any discussion of modern press-audience 
behaviors and exacerbates gaps between those behaviors and the 
assumptions of the Court. 
 
b. The Changing Information Landscape 
Another reason that press-audience dynamics seem so starkly different—
and that the threat to truth and truthseeking seems so grave—in the present 
moment is a fear that the changing information landscape is exacerbating 
existing human limitations and pathologies. The explosion of available 
information risks “infobesity”236 or information overload that presumably 
heightens the need for (and tendency to) resort to shortcuts and heuristics 
that conserve cognitive resources, potentially at the expense of accuracy 
and truthseeking. Moreover, the advent and exponential growth of social 
media as a source of news and forum for political discussion may both 
enable and amplify biased search and selective exposure. If these fears 
come to fruition, the gap between our media reality and the Court’s 
assumptions of press audience willingness to seek out truth that conflicts 
with their worldview and preexisting beliefs is likely to widen. 
Despite the internet’s multiplication of news sources and facilitation of 
easy access to a wide and diverse array of news outlets, many fear that—
rather than diversifying our media diet—we will choose to inhabit online 
echo chambers where we surround ourselves with people and information 
with which we agree.237 Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that there 
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is a growing risk that people’s online lives will be ideologically siloed 
because of “people’s growing power to filter what they see” and 
“providers’ growing power to filter for each of us, based on what they 
know about us.” 238   Individual tendency toward biased search and 
selective exposure will likely be magnified by algorithms employed by 
social media and other websites designed to keep us on their sites as long 
as possible (and thereby maximize revenue) by serving up the kind of 
ideologically congruent content it thinks (probably correctly) that we want 
to see.  
The resulting “filter bubbles,”239 may augment and entrench selective 
exposure among even the best-intended who might want more balanced 
information exposure, as so much of that filtering occurs either entirely or 
partially unbeknownst to us in service of powerful profit motives. In the 
partisan context, this phenomenon is perhaps most vividly captured by the 
Wall Street Journal’s Red Feed/Blue Feed project, which juxtaposes a 
simulated liberal (“blue”) next to a conservative (“red”) Facebook feed, 
highlighting the divergence between red and blue echo chambers on issues 
from President Trump to immigration to guns to abortion.240 Viewing the 
two feeds, one does indeed wonder if conservatives and liberals are living 
in two different Americas, or at least in two different online Americas.  
Such “ideological segregation,” 241  driven by potent profit motives 
reinforcing and exacerbating our own worst instincts, portends serious 
challenges for democratic information flow premised on truth seeking 
through exposure to conflicting views. 
Empirical research suggests that the direst predictions about social-media 
driven echo chambers and filter bubbles have not—or at least have not 
yet—come to pass. Thus far, most studies have found that, self-reporting 
about media preferences notwithstanding, there is still large overlap 
between the news actually viewed by Republicans and Democrats—in 
large part because most internet users still get most of their news from a 
handful of relatively mainstream media outlets. A large-scale analysis of 
online behavioral data242 from 2015 and 2016, including the run-up to the 
2016 presidential election, found that the “media diets of Democrats and 
Republicans overlap more than they diverge and center around the middle 
of the ideological spectrum,” a “pattern . . . largely driven by the 
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dominance of mainstream, relatively centrist websites—the kinds of 
‘general-interest intermediaries’” of media days of yore.243 Moreover, “the 
media diets of the vast majority of people—regardless of political 
orientation—are moderate, with only a small share of highly partisan 
respondents driving a disproportionate amount of traffic to relatively 
extreme outlets, especially on the right.”244 Other studies have reached 
similar conclusions.245 
There are, nonetheless, real reasons to be concerned about whether the 
shift to internet news consumption will exacerbate polarization, especially 
as social media sites like Facebook increasingly acting as a “front page” 
for media outlets,246 as some data does suggest that greater polarization 
may occur when people use social media to get their news.247 Increasingly 
sophisticated algorithms may also drive more “ideological segregation” 248  
in the future.  
While both hyperpartisanship and the changing information landscape 
have a complex relationship with the cognitive limitations addressed in 
Part III.B.1—at times seeming to be caused by those limitations and at 
times seeming to amplify them—both of these factors widen the gap 
between the Supreme Court’s assumptions about press consumers and 
their real-world desires, capacities, and behaviors.   
IV. THEORETICAL RESPONSES TO THE GAP BETWEEN ASSUMPTION 
AND REALITY 
This gap seems to threaten both the marketplace-of-ideas theory of the 
press and its concomitant justifications for press protections. Indeed, when 
viewed through a narrow lens, there are good reasons to be frustrated with 
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor. Long-recognized critiques—that 
individual recipients of information are not, in fact, always rational market 
participants— are increasingly supported by clear social science research 
and are coming to a head in particularly powerful ways in the emotion-
driven, Post-Truthism media climate.  Plainly, consumers of information 
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do not necessarily behave in the way the U.S. Supreme Court routinely 
characterizes them. They often do not thirst for empirical facts, engage in 
a truthseeking dialectic, desire to receive information that doesn’t comport 
with previously held views, have the cognitive ability to rationally process 
information without bias, or possess a capacity to update old positions 
based on newer, more correct factual information. In our new, 
hyperpartisan, algorithmically determined, information-siloed world, this 
may be increasingly the case.  
 
If the most basic premise of the marketplace-of-ideas approach is 
sometimes—or even routinely—inaccurate, we might criticize the theory 
as inapt and the press protections justified by the model as unwarranted.  
 
But this suggestion misconceptualizes both the ongoing utility of the 
marketplace metaphor and the ongoing importance of press functions in a 
complex information society. Indeed, rather than undercutting the 
rationales for press protection, these information-consumer flaws 
underscore the need for vibrant protection of market-enhancing press 
institutions. They form the basis for a theory of press protection that 
centers on the set of press functions that can directly compensate for these 
individual limitations and can advance the search for truth on a population 
level even when that search is challenging on an individual level. At this 
unique moment for both information distribution and jurisprudential 
development, when scholarly attention has turned to the scope and 
purpose of the First Amendment’s Press Clause,249 this approach will 
prove valuable to the ongoing efforts to doctrinally situate that Clause and 
to identify which entities in the new media landscape might invoke its 
protections. 
 
A. A Wider Marketplace Inquiry: Why Audience Shortcomings Don’t 
Undermine Press Freedom Rationales 
 
The philosophical and jurisprudential origins of the marketplace analogy 
and a vibrant body of institutional First Amendment literature all support 
an approach that identifies entities as the constitutionally protected “press” 
based on their performance of market-enhancing functions that help 
compensate for individual information-consumer flaws.  
 
Even the earliest proponents of the marketplace-of-ideas theory 
recognized that individual information consumers would not be perfect 
truthseekers. Indeed, J.S. Mills, one of the theory’s originators, explicitly 
acknowledged that the inherent limitations and biases of human cognition 
would impede the search for truth: “Men are not more zealous for truth 
than they often are for error.”250 Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose landmark 
dissent in Abrams v. United States251 infused the theory into modern 
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American jurisprudence, was likewise skeptical of the truthseeking 
motivations and capabilities of individual information consumers. He was 
struck by “how seldom and slowly people yield” to errors in their own 
thinking252 and was convinced that society would need more than 
individual “rational or empirical refutation” to advance understanding and 
knowledge.253  
 
Moreover, the instinct that institutions might be important partners in this 
truthseeking endeavor builds on the scholarly scaffolding already erected 
by Institutional First Amendment theory, which asserts that in at least 
some contexts, societal institutions might serve as intermediating devices 
and surrogates for important First Amendment values.254 From a 
marketplace-of-ideas approach, this would call for protection of 
institutional functions that are uniquely market-enhancing and facilitating 
of the flow of information and ideas.255 As Joseph Blocher argued in his 
detailed investigation of universities as marketplace-enhancing 
institutions, the First Amendment’s solicitude for the operation of the 
marketplace of ideas calls for protection of entities that mitigate the costs 
of transmitting, receiving, and processing information.256 While 
information is being consumed at the individual level, transaction costs are 
often defrayed at the institutional level,257 and when this institutional 
contribution is cognizable, constitutional protection is warranted. 
 
This institutional recognition is particularly warranted for the press, 
because the First Amendment’s Press Clause may provide a unique 
doctrinal home for constitutional protection of its function.258 In recent 
years, scholars have made compelling arguments, rooted in textualism, 
originalism, and pragmatism,259 that the Court should recognize a Press 
Clause doctrine separate from and nonredundant to the Speech Clause, 
offering protection to a “press” that would not be available to an ordinary 
speaker.260 At this critical moment, when important work remains to be 
done in theorizing the role of that Clause—and when a rapidly changing 
media topography poses challenges for satisfactorily identifying “the 
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press”261—the marketplace-of-ideas theory can contribute important 
insights to the courts’ functional approach to both issues. A careful 
investigation of the market-enhancing functions that might qualify an 
entity as the “press” for constitutional purposes can provide one tool for 
determining which actors receive that protection.  
 
While press protection is justified for a number of theoretical and 
normative reasons that, together, should shape the wider inquiry into who 
constitutes the press,262 marketplace-of-ideas analysis can and should 
inform this assessment, and may be particularly valuable as the collapse of 
once-dominant media structures makes it all the more important that the 
inquiry focus on function rather than self-identification or legacy-media 
status. 
 
Thus, this inquiry—into whether an entity is performing those core tasks 
that make its admittedly imperfect audience of information consumers 
better able to participate in marketplace truthseeking—is an important but 
as yet unrecognized component of the emerging conversations on the 
Press Clause.263 In other words, the Court can jettison its erroneous and 
confusing focus on individual behavior and audience capacity without 
abandoning the marketplace of ideas as a framework. The theory 
continues to have an important place within modern media-law doctrine, 
with a new focus on the institutional Press Clause functions that enhance 
audience members’ functioning within the marketplace. 
 
 
B. Identifying “Market-Enhancing” Features of “The Press” 
 
As noted above, the press can improve the search for truth in the 
marketplace of ideas by compensating for individual deficiencies in 
truthseeking, rational processing, and updating. A careful investigation 
and identification of the specific market-enhancing press functions that 
serve this goal will help construct a more appropriate marketplace-of-ideas 
theory in the press-freedom context and help identify who, in the changing 
media topography, qualifies as “the press” under an invigorated Press 
Clause doctrine.  
 
While the judicial inquiry into these functions should be ongoing and 
might acknowledge new market enhancements as they emerge, a set of 
functions commonly served by entities historically thought of as “the 
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press” can help structure the conversation about how this compensation 
for individual limitations operates and why market-enhancing functions 
are worthy of constitutional protection.264 Press functions might include, 
for example, doing the following tasks on behalf of audience members: (1) 
newsgathering, (2) prioritizing, (3) substantiating, (4) educating, and (5) 
accessing. As described below, these press functions make the audience 
member more likely or more able to engage in truthseeking, to process 
information rationally, and to update facts and opinions about the 




The act of newsgathering—of identifying newsworthy questions and then 
investigating and reporting their answers to a wider audience—is a 
critically important enhancer of the marketplace of ideas. It introduces 
market efficiencies by reducing information-collecting costs, information-
consumption costs, and information-transaction costs. In so doing, it 
compensates for the now clearly understood tendencies of individual 
information consumers to conserve cognitive resources, to struggle with 
bounded rationality, and to experience information overload.265  
 
Newsgathering shifts some of the most burdensome truthseeking tasks to 
press entities who “devote time, resources, and expertise” to the work of 
“informing the public on newsworthy matters.”266 With the press acting as 
a market-enhancing partner—“a full participant in public dialogue, 
identifying issues, originating ideas, and critiquing the ideas of 
others”267—the reader has less work to do. Easily accessible facts, 
compiled by those who have engaged in newsgathering, leave the reader 
with less need to resort to mental shortcuts that might otherwise hinder the 
search for truth.268 
 
Moreover, on behalf of its larger audience, the press representative can 
connect with people and information in ways that help audience members 
discover, compare, and elucidate ideas more cheaply and efficiently. One 
identifying feature of the press is that it “makes it its business to 
investigate and obtain additional knowledge initially lacked” by the press 
and its audience.269 It would be deeply inefficient for every person in the 
town to travel to city hall, fully prepared to ask the mayor thoughtful 
questions about the city roads budget, but one reporter can tackle that 
information-gathering task on behalf of the whole and enhance the 
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marketplace of ideas. As repeat players, members of the press often have 
superior knowledge about how and where to get information and pre-
existing relationships with those who possess that information.270 Press 
entities that “place calls, ask questions, and seek information” act as 
proxies for their audience members, who technically could perform those 
tasks, but whose limited time, resources, and cognitive bandwidth mean 
they almost certainly will not do so.271 As Justice Powell once noted, 
“[f]or most citizens, the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy 
events is hopelessly unrealistic,” and thus, in “seeking out the news, the 
press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large.”272 
 
The market enhancement runs in the opposite direction, as well, 
benefitting those from whom the press gathers newsworthy information. 
Because “transaction costs are paid not just by those trying to find good 
ideas, but by those trying to spread them,” the role of the press as a 
disseminator of sources’ ideas is equally important.273 It is a market-
enhancing press function to act as a known repository for those who have 
information to share, and to thereby enhance “the circulation of 
information” 274 on important matters.  Information sources who cannot 
reasonably deliver their facts to each individual in the community can rely 
on trusted press entities to disseminate that information widely.275 
Recognition of this function helps explain why some have argued that an 
established audience or regular publication are features that should weigh 




The market-enhancing press function of prioritizing—sifting through large 
amounts of potentially interesting or potentially useful information and 
curating it for use by individual idea consumers—improves the otherwise 
faulty consumer-level operation of the marketplace of ideas. It counteracts 
individual consumer deficiencies rooted in inadequate time and cognitive 
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resources for digesting the massive quantities of available information,277 
thus compensating for some of the key constraints that encourage resort to 
heuristics that may not always facilitate truthseeking, rational processing, 
or the updating of ideas.  
 
Indeed, gatekeeping is among the functions most commonly recognized as 
core to the identification of the press for Press Clause purposes, both as an 
historical matter278 and as an ongoing practical matter.279 “In a society in 
which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to 
observe at first hand,” he has to rely on a market-enhancing press actor “to 
bring to him [the information] in convenient form.”280 In the modern “age 
of overwhelming information volume,”281 this is true on an ever-
increasing scale.282 If market enhancement is the guide, offering a clear, 
consistent, reliable process to sift through this unmanageable quantity of 
information283 is a core function of the constitutional “press.”  
 
The specific nature of this press prioritizing is key to its value to the 
marketplace of ideas. Merely reducing the amount of information passed 
along to the consumer, even in a curated or tailored way, is not as market-
enhancing as prioritization that involves an exercise of editorial 
discretion—an application of “journalistic judgment of priorities and 
newsworthiness.”284 The press “brings its expertise and judgment to bear 
in sifting newsworthy information from that which is not,”285 and it is the 
nature of this editorial decisionmaking that so uniquely compensates for 
the widest range of individual market failures.286  
 
The prioritizing function draws upon a body of experience in identifying 
subjects that are important for citizens and communities, and in so doing, 
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it “structures public discussion and builds community discourse by 
starting conversations and contributing carefully sifted useful information 
as these conversations continue.”287 The kind of editorial discretion and 
journalistic judgments that truly serve these purposes are likely to be more 
market-enhancing than the mere sorting and “prioritization” of 
information content that some entities, like search engines, perform today. 
These functional differences may aid courts in answering emergent 
questions about whether new information-dissemination entities engaged 
in algorithmic curation are fulfilling press functions in a way that would 
qualify them for special press protections.288 
 
The marketplace-enhancing prioritization function manifests itself not 
only in the selection of the news but also in its organization and 
presentation. Information consumers rely on the press not just to sift for 
what to include but also to signal “which of those included items are more 
pressing, more relevant to the listener, or more worthy of attention.”289 
This function thus compensates not only for audience members’ limited 
time and resources, but also for their limited processing capabilities and 
limited “knowledge about the relative significance or magnitude of a piece 
of news.”290 In the legacy media, this aspect of the prioritizing function 
has been performed quite explicitly, with labels like “breaking news” and 
“top story,” and with “headlines, placement, and other signaling devices 
offering listeners reliable markers of the institutional press speaker’s 
assessment of importance,”291 but the tools by which it could be performed 
are not stagnant. Knowing, as we now do, that individual information 
consumers struggle with “assigning value and importance to 
information,”292 entities that fill that gap enhance the market. 
 
Put differently, the press as institutional speaker makes content-curating 
choices that serve as an additional, positive heuristic for press consumers, 
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who can select the shortcuts they most trust by choosing “from among 
available curated speech packages.”293 An audience member “cannot 
possibly make all decisions about all possible streams of information, but 
… can make the important decision that she, in general, agrees with the 
sifting, prioritizing, and other curating values”294 of particular news 
organizations. Each news organization’s distinctive mechanism for sifting 
what is newsworthy and for prioritizing which items “are more pressing, 
more relevant to the listener, or more worthy of attention”295 can be a tool 
that inches the information consumer closer to knowledge and closer to 
democratic participation. The news-outlet-as-positive-heuristic is thus 
market-enhancing and should lead to special protection for institutional 
actors who prioritize and package information and engage intellectually on 
the audience’s behalf.  
 
3. Substantiating 
The press function of substantiating—testing factual information from 
other sources to verify, authenticate, and confirm—enhances the 
marketplace of ideas and compensates for shortcomings of individual 
information consumers. Institutions that perform this corroborative 
function consistently over time build reputational goodwill as repeat 
players and permit cheaper transaction of information. Indeed, just as 
individuals can use the press as a heuristic to access the curated 
information package they prefer, they can use a trusted press outlet as a 
heuristic for obtaining reliable, verified facts, without having to do that 
substantiation themselves. Verification is thus a central market-enhancing 
function that can help identify an entity as the press for constitutional 
purposes.    
 
Press institutions with clear fact-checking processes superimpose a set of 
systemic, population-serving behaviors that an individual information 
consumer cannot or will not do for herself. An institutional methodology 
demanding investigation of facts before they are published and expecting 
assertions to be properly sourced through probing inquiry296 substitutes for 
a thorough investigation by individuals, who often lack the cognitive 
instincts to challenge information or the motivation to dig for contrary 
information. An entity that requires itself to perform this function 
advances truthseeking in the wider marketplace of ideas. 
 
Beyond the episodic benefits of finding and substantiating discrete factual 
truths, there is more sustained market-enhancing impact when prolonged 
performance of this function over time builds institutional reputations for 
verification. This reputational factor introduces truthseeking efficiencies 
both in the gathering and distributing of information. A press entity with 
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“accountability to its audience” and “attention to professional standards or 
ethics”297 develops a reputation for imparting trustworthy, accurate 
information and a regular, established audience that continues to demand 
those standards of verification.298 As Joseph Blocher has noted, these 
repeat-player actions form some of the most obvious parallels between 
actual market institutions and marketplace-of-ideas institutions like the 
press:299 “In both scenarios, institutions made up of repeat players are 
more likely to have communication-enhancing norms,” and “[j]ust like 
market actors, repeat speech players are less likely to violate norms, lie, or 
break promises, because they know that repeat interactions are 
inevitable.”300  
 
Much like the universities that Blocher explored as speech institutions, the 
press regularizes relationships, allowing individuals within the system to 
rely on an institutional actor with a “reputation for imparting accurate 
information,” and thereby “to transact ideas more cheaply.”301 This 
efficiency of communication enhances the marketplace in part because 
individual press consumers “feel less of a duty to double-check the 
information they are receiving” than they would if a random person on a 
street corner were shouting the very same information.302 The trust the 
press audience members place in the information they receive “saves them 
from having to pay what could otherwise be substantial information 
costs”303—costs that the cognitive behavior science and psychology 
literature tells us the individual almost certainly will not incur. 
Additionally, a news outlet’s reputation for fact-verification also reduces 
information transmission costs for sources, including anonymous sources, 
because their choice of outlet allows them to signal to the wider press 
audience that their information is reliable because the news outlet will 
have taken appropriate steps to verify it.   
 
In this way, the verification function compensates for many of the 
truthseeking and rational processing limitations of individual information 
consumers. It engages the core processes of challenging, testing, and 
confronting information in ways that are not naturally occurring for the 
individual. It improves upon the individual’s limited capacity to update by 
preemptively checking, replacing, and updating untruthful information in 
the course of newsgathering, well before the information is delivered to 
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the consumer. The reputational integrity of a market-enhancing institution 
combats the tendency for emotion-based judgments by creating a pattern 
of efficient fact-seeking and fact-trusting by idea consumers. It combats 
the effects of motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance by 
establishing a safe and trusted place for counternarratives to flourish.304 A 
news consumer who might not otherwise embrace ideas that challenge her 
worldview may be more inclined to do so when the institution she has 
long trusted with verification insists that its verification process has 
disproven the position.  
 
Importantly, a judicial inquiry into whether an entity serves the 
verification function—and thus might properly be identified as the press—
is not an inquiry into whether the specific material that the entity 
published was true. The latter inquiry oversteps First Amendment bounds 
in dangerous ways and harms rather than benefits the marketplace of 
ideas. 305 The test is not whether the press was truthful, but rather whether 
the press had in place a process for truthseeking— factual investigation, 
verification, corroboration, and clarification. Institutions that have such 
mechanisms in place of course will not be failsafe; sometimes they will 
publish falsehood.306 But the existence of the function counteracts the 
individual limitations of consumers in compelling ways and is therefore a 
market-enhancing function that helps identify a press actor who may 
warrant special protection. 
 
4. Educating and Contextualizing  
Educating—developing expertise in learning about matters of public 
concern and then providing necessary context when teaching others the 
information learned—is a core market-enhancing function that can 
identify entities that are serving the press role. While the Post-Truthism 
critique rightly observes that audience members struggle on their own to 
put factual information to broad and meaningful use, the press’s educative 
function helps offset that limitation by making information accessible, 
understandable and useable.  
 
The press educative function enhances the marketplace of ideas in two 
complementary ways, because the press acts both as a learner, in a proxy 
role for individuals who themselves face barriers to full learning, and as a 
teacher, interpreting and contextualizing information for individuals who 
receive the information. As learners, press entities develop expertise in 
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knowledge acquisition.307 Through training and experience, members of 
the press know who to ask for information and what to ask of them, and 
have structures in place that make them quicker to understand facts that 
are provided, more likely to appreciate nuance within those facts, and 
better able to probe for pertinent detail and push for clarification than the 
average individual audience member. When the press acts as learner, all of 
those learning behaviors are still occurring for the wider population, 
within a framework of proficiency unmatched and unmatchable on an 
individual scale, and this is a market efficiency that can be rewarded with 
special protection for press actors.  
 
When the press entity passes along what it has learned to its audience, it 
likewise introduces market efficiencies through its teaching role. The role 
of the press as educator is widely recognized,308 and like other trusted 
educators, the press makes information easier to digest and easier to use. 
So, for example, on complicated matters of governmental and public 
affairs, the press acts as “one of the great interpreters,”309 contributing to 
“public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the 
functioning of the entire criminal justice system.”310 This function plays “a 
particularly important role in explaining and distributing information 
about other institutions whose functioning would otherwise be impossible 
for the average citizen to follow.”311 When information that is hard to 
understand is made understandable and complexity is simplified, the 
marketplace of ideas functions more smoothly—and truthseeking, rational 
processing, and updating are all enabled. “Put simply, we rely on the press 
to tell us how the world works,”312 because the world works in ways that 
are unlikely to be accurately processed without assistance. 
 
The best of this educating involves not only passing along clarified 
information, but adding value by “plac[ing] news stories in context 
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locally, nationally, or over time.”313 The individual audience member’s 
rational processing limitations are such that she otherwise cannot or will 
not appreciate the “big picture,” and thus she is likely to reach erroneous 
conclusions even from otherwise factual information. But the educative 
press function compensates for these shortcomings by “provid[ing] 
context and reveal[ing] impact, exposing the story behind the story and 
illuminating the nuances beyond the facts.”314 It does this in both 
broadening and narrowing ways.315 The broadening contextualization 
function expands the audience member’s thinking on an issue by 
providing “historical or comparative perspective”316 or additional 
background that illuminates the fuller truth that the marketplace seeks to 
advance. As David Anderson has noted, this contextualizing—“it was the 
fourth murder in the neighborhood this year,” “a study by another group of 
scientists reached a different conclusion,” or “this was the third 
consecutive quarter of employment gains”317— is core to what it means to 
be functioning as the press.318 The narrowing task—for example, telling 
the story of a larger issue or policy through the narrative of affected 
individuals, a single impacted business, or another illustrative 
microcosm—likewise adds insight the audience member could not achieve 
alone. 
 
In the aggregate, this educative function promises to offset some of the 
gravest limitations of individual audience members. While education is 
not a panacea, the marketplace of ideas is unquestionably enhanced when 
a reliable, consistent educator provides accurate context and necessary 
depth of coverage. The marketplace shortcoming of fundamental error 
attribution,319 for example, can be diminished. An assumption that bad 
things happen primarily to bad people is more difficult to hold when a 
trusted educative narrator is describing the circumstances in which bad 
things are happening to good people. System justification320 and the 
victim-blaming that attends may be counteracted by context that provides 
fuller details of the causes of and solutions to local and national problems. 
Cognitive limitations presenting barriers to accurate assessment of hazards 
may be softened when press entities contextualize the relative risk of 
different threats. An entity that performs the task of learning, and then the 
task of interpreting the information it gathers for others,321 places 
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Lastly, the act of accessing—of retrieving records and visiting locations 
on behalf of a wider audience—is market-enhancing. When entities 
perform this task, they reduce information collection and consumption 
costs and offset the individual idea consumer’s tendency to avoid some 
fact-gathering. Most importantly, they compensate for serious deficiencies 
of time and resources that render impossible or impracticable some 
truthseeking on matters of public affairs.322  
 
In a number of important contexts, the entire population possesses the 
constitutional or statutory right to access and observe the government “at 
first hand.”323 However, for all of the reasons addressed above, the vast 
majority of individual citizens are not likely to put these rights to use. An 
institutional press entity acting as proxy makes it possible for the rights to 
be invoked and for the population to enjoy the substantial benefits of 
access—including government accountability and ongoing scrutiny of 
procedures conducted in the name of the people.324 Those serving this 
market-enhancing function have a stronger claim to identification as “the 
press.” 
 
So, for example, “instead of relying on personal observation or reports 
from neighbors as in the past, most people receive information concerning 
trials through the media.”325 When “firsthand observation” cannot occur, 
the individual consumers can rely instead on observations the press 
communicates to those not in attendance, with press observers thus 
“functioning as surrogates for the public.”326 The same is true when press 
entities gather and publish information from public records.327 Indeed, 
“[w]ithout the information provided by the press, most of us and many of 
our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register 
opinions on the administration of government generally.”328 Thus, there is 
a marketplace justification for protecting the act of physically standing in 
the stead of the wider audience. 
 
How to protect and expand this beneficial proxy access and how to define 
who qualifies to perform it are major motivating questions in the 
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developing literature on the invigoration of the Press Clause.329 
Determining who is “the press” is important so that those truly acting as 
surrogates can be “provided special seating and priority of entry so that 
they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard”330 in 
courtrooms, White House press conferences, and other places where 
access is allowed but space limitations and the practicalities of resource 
limitations mean the collective whole cannot attend, observe, participate, 
or investigate. It may also prove important in an expanded doctrine of 
access, because adequately defining the press and fully embracing its 
market-enhancing proxy role may call for press access to places where no 
broad public access is feasible, such as prisons and immigration detention 
centers, but a small set of representative proxies could observe on behalf 
of that broader public and thereby create an expanded and more efficient 
marketplace of ideas.331 
 
Future scholarship and caselaw might well identify other press functions 
that are market-enhancing because they help press audiences compensate 
for their individual cognitive biases and limitations. Moreover, additional 
factors—derived from other theoretical justifications for press 
protection—may also be part of the “holistic” inquiry332 that helps identify 
what entities should count as the “press” for purposes of meriting Press 
Clause-specific protections. 
 
We recognize, of course, that our proposed approach to addressing the gap 
between the Supreme Court’s press audience assumptions and reality is 
not a panacea for the impact those limitations have on our truthseeking, 
rational processing, and updating capacities. Even when aided by market-
enhancing press entities, press audiences will still be composed of flawed 
human beings who have limited capacity and desire to objectively seek out 
and consume news.  
 
The point of establishing and facilitating a marketplace of ideas is not, 
however, to guarantee the emergence of truth over error, but to provide the 
best conditions to facilitate the ongoing search for truth and refinement of 
public opinion over time. Like J.S. Mill’s, our argument is for establishing 
“the optimal conditions for truth-discovery,”333 not embarking on a 
quixotic quest for an infallible system that inexorably leads to discovery of 
truth. 
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C. Confronting Partisanship: Can the Partisan Press Be Market-
Enhancing? 
The functions addressed above are uniformly market-enhancing. But some 
press features that carry the potential to be market-enhancing also carry 
the potential to be market-inhibiting, and thus would require more careful 
analysis by the Court. Partisanship is the clearest example of such a press 
feature.  
The Supreme Court has, for at least the last half-century, assumed that the 
market-enhancing functions outlined in Part IV.B would be performed by 
mainstream media outlets—by widely-trusted, shared, transpartisan, 
expert institutional gatekeepers of information334—that would strive to be 
accepted arbiters of objective truth.335  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
case law has assumed, not only that there will be one distinct kind of 
entity recognizable as “the press”;336 but that this singular, distinct press 
will be serving one distinct set of “public” informational needs, shared by 
all and determined by the press as expert gatekeeper. 337  This 
undifferentiated “public” would trust “the press” to provide impartial, 
objective, and balanced coverage on the “major public issues of our 
time.”338  
Today, while many people continue to rely on the mainstream press to 
perform critical market-enhancing functions,339 the rising popularity of 
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555 (granting special press access to criminal trials to vindicate public’s constitutional 
right to attend). 
339 Most news consumers still “rely heavily” on relatively neutral, mainstream sources of 
information.  See, e.g., Carnahan et al., supra note 168, at 10 (observing that, “[n]ot 




“partisan press” fundamentally challenges the assumption of a single, 
monolithic press audience that will look to the “mainstream media,” as a 
shared, trusted source of reliable, objective facts and information.  Rather 
than relying solely on “traditional news outlets [that] emphasize balance 
and objectivity,”340 people increasingly get at least some of their news 
from partisan media outlets, “opinionated media”341 that “provide a more 
one-sided take on the day’s events”342 and promote particular political 
narratives and agendas.343  
 
Of course, partisan media isn’t new. “Indeed, for most of American 
history, the news media were partisan media.”344 Still, some might worry 
whether—in an age of potential social media echo chambers and 
algorithms that reinforce our tendency to choose only congenial news 
sources—partisan news sources can serve important “market-enhancing” 
functions or whether they will be primarily “market-inhibiting.” And, 
indeed, partisan press entities are likely to have more mixed impacts on 
the marketplace of ideas than traditional media outlets.  
 
1. Partisanship as a heuristic for preferred prioritization and 
curation  
First, individuals may employ partisanship as a heuristic for finding press 
entities with a particular, identifiable approach to prioritization and 
curation. Thus, for example, the existence of partisan news sources can 
facilitate individuals’ ability to quickly find and digest information on the 
issues they consider most pressing, from the perspective they consider 
most interesting, and with the kind of context they consider most relevant. 
So understood, reliance on partisan press is a specific instance of the more 
general press-as-heuristic phenomenon that aids people’s search for truth 
by reducing search costs.345 From this perspective, the proliferation of 
news sources generally, and the emergence of partisan press in particular, 
can be market-enhancing,346 as partisan outlets provide additional media 
                                                                                                                     
surprisingly online political information-seekers, including ideologues, still rely heavily 
on sources that are nonideological,” and that in 2012 “around 43% of political 
conservatives and 51% of political liberals reported using neutral sources with varying 
degrees of regularity”).   
340 MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, HOW PARTISAN MEDIA POLARIZE AMERICA 4 (2013). 
341 Id. at 7. 
342 Id. at 4. 
343 Id. at 8 (citation omitted) (observing that, in partisan media, “[s]tories are ‘framed, 
spun, and slanted so that certain political agendas are advanced’” and facts are 
“present[ed] in such a way to support a particular conclusion”). 
344 LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 8. 
345 The explosion of available information and media options presumably increases 
reliance on this kind of partisan heuristic. See KEVIN ARCENEAUX & MARTIN JOHNSON, 
CHANGING MINDS OR CHANGING CHANNELS?:  PARTISAN NEWS IN AN AGE OF CHOICE 
163-64 (2013).  
346 During the heyday of the mainstream press, power to set the national news agenda 
was concentrated in the hands of “a small set of media elites,”  LEVENDUSKY, supra note 
340, at 151, at the expense of a more diverse set of potential voices and audiences. The 
emergence of new media outlets that serve niche information needs or investigate issues 




options that clearly signal some important features of their curated news 
packages.  
 
An individual who wishes to get a balanced take on the news might use 
this partisan signaling to expose herself to arguments on “both sides” of 
the partisan divide. Some press consumers may be suspicious of the very 
notion of “objectivity” and prefer that their news sources make their 
primary biases explicit so that the consumer doesn’t have to spend time 
and mental effort trying to identify those biases. This ability to achieve 
balanced coverage by consuming a variety of identifiable partisan news 
voices is clearly market-enhancing.  
 
Relatedly, partisan media can also serve a market-enhancing function by 
reducing search costs for those who affirmatively want to seek out 
“counterattitudinal information” that challenges their existing views and 
political identity.  Thus, for example, a Democrat might seek out an 
explicitly Republican media outlet (or vice versa) to probe and challenge 
her existing views. Such engagement with counterattitudinal information 
is actually quite common.347 Whether that exposure ultimately exacerbates 
or mitigates the tendency toward motivational reasoning may depend on 
why the person is engaging that material. Research suggests that exposure 
to counterattitudinal information tends to further polarize staunch 
partisans, perhaps because they seek out the “other side’s perspective” 
primarily to engage in the kind of counterargument and defense of existing 
views that tends to entrench people’s priors and drive them to take even 
more extreme positions.348 In contrast, moderates who engage with 
counterattitudinal information appear more interested in true engagement 
and more open to revising their existing views in the direction of the 
newly acquired information.349   
 
As the last example illustrates, reliance on partisanship as a heuristic for 
preferred prioritization is not uniformly market enhancing.  Sometimes 
individuals will use that heuristic to choose partisan press because they 
wish to consume only information that will be ideologically congenial or 
                                                                                                                     
and facts that traditional media may have neglected should enhance the overall 
marketplace of information. 
347 Dustin Carnahan et al., supra note 168, at 10 (observing that “many [experimental] 
respondents reported using counterattitudinal sources, with 11% using at least one 
counterattitudinal source in the past week in 2008 and 31% reporting use of such source 
with varying regularity in 2012” and thus “that counterattitudinal sources continued to be 
used among a nontrivial segment of the population despite ample opportunity to do 
otherwise”). It is particularly common among those who also seek out proattitudinal 
information. Id. at 9 (noting that “[d]espite varied explanations as to why, proattitudinal 
site use has been shown to [be] highly correlated with counterattitudinal site use”). 
348 See LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 21 (arguing that counterattitudinal (or 
“crosscutting” media) “polarize some subjects (those with strong prior attitudes), and 
depolarize others (those who find crosscutting media to be highly credible”). 
349 See id. 




“proattitudinal”350—information that aligns with and confirms their 
partisan priors and thus protects, reinforces, and expresses their partisan 
political identities.351 So employed, partisan media is “market-inhibiting”: 
it merely exacerbates individuals’ cognitive biases, by facilitating partisan 
“motivated reasoning” and more efficient “biased search.”  
 
This type of partisan media consumption can “intensify” motivated 
reasoning and thereby entrench and polarize views because proattitudinal 
messages—that partisans are already inclined to accept—are presented 
without counterargument and thus “seem stronger and even more 
persuasive,”352 and because “[p]artisan media’s framing of the news as a 
struggle between the two major parties” increases the salience of these 
political divisions and “activates viewers’ partisan identities,”353 
heightening the motivation to protect and express these identities. Indeed, 
some research suggests that consumption of “like-minded” partisan media 
makes “viewers become more polarized, more certain their beliefs are the 
correct ones, less willing to compromise and support bipartisanship, and 
more willing to attribute election victories by the other side to nefarious 
motives.”354  
 
2. Partisanship as a heuristic for accurate verification  
Rather than seeking out information from a particular partisan perspective, 
people who consume partisan media might merely be seeking accurate 
                                                
350 See Matthew A. Baum & Phil Gussin, In the Eye of the Beholder: How Information 
Shortcuts Shape Individual Perceptions of Bias in the Media, 3 QUARTERLY J. OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 15 (2007) (observing that “a media outlet’s brand name may serve 
as a powerful information shortcut” for finding information that is  “probably dissonant” 
or “probably consonant”). 
351 See, e.g., Toby Bolsen et al., The Impact of Message Source on the Effectiveness of 
Communications About Climate Change, 41 SCIENCE COMMUNICATION 464-487 (2019) 
(“Partisans in pursuit of value-affirming information may . . . turn to sources who share 
their group identity or cultural worldviews in seeking out or interpreting any new 
information about climate change.”). 
352 LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 51. 
353 Id. at 52. Partisan media may also promote affective polarization—negative emotions 
toward members of opposing political parties—by “activating” and increasing the 
salience of political identity and by valorizing party elites’ demonization of political 
opponents and members of the opposite party. R. Kelly Garret et al., supra note 358, at 3, 
16. 
354 LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 136. The extent of this effect is contested, 
particularly because it can be difficult to discern whether partisan media drive 
polarization or merely reflect it. ARCENEAUX & JOHNSON, supra note 345, at 150 
(reporting “evidence that partisan cable news reflects, rather than creates, polarization” in 
the American polity). While Levendusky finds substantial evidence that consumption of 
partisan media increases polarization, see id., Arceneaux and Johnson argue that the 
direct effects of partisan media on polarization are much more limited because many 
people opt out of news coverage altogether in favorite of entertainment options and that 
the confirmed partisans who seek out partisan coverage are already firmly entrenched in 
their views. They argue that the larger experimental effects other researchers observe 
occur when people who are otherwise news-avoidant (who would generally choose 
entertainment over news) are forced to consume partisan media in unnatural experimental 
conditions. See ARCENEAUX & JOHNSON, supra note 345, 150, 152. 




information—pursuing an accuracy, truthseeking goal—by turning to 
those sources they believe are the most credible and trustworthy fact-
verifiers,355  with partisanship serving as a heuristic or mediator for source 
credibility and trust.356 As Dan Kahan has explained: “Individuals more 
readily impute expert knowledge and trustworthiness to information 
sources whom they perceive as sharing their worldviews and deny the 
same to those whose worldviews they perceive as different from theirs.”357 
Indeed, the empirical findings bear out that suggestion that people will 
tend to trust information sources that align with their political views and 
distrust those that don’t.358 The 2014 Pew Research study that documented 
strong partisan differences in news outlet preferences also found that 
“ideological differences” about which news sources to trust “are especially 
stark.”359  
 
If partisanship were a good proxy for responsible verification of facts, this 
heuristic might be market-enhancing shortcut, but there is no reason to 
assume this is so.  Nonetheless, information consumers’ use of bare 
partisanship as a proxy for accuracy and credibility may be unproblematic 
if the trusted outlet does, in fact, engage in fact-checking. If it does not, 
the situation risks uncritical acceptance of misinformation or 
disinformation. In either event, however, the partisan nature of the press 
should be largely irrelevant to a court’s determination of whether that 
entity engages in market-enhancing verification or not. 
 
There is, however, one important sense in which this heightened trust of 
ideologically friendly sources of information may enable the partisan press 
to play a unique market-enhancing role: by countering “motivated 
reasoning” and thereby making co-partisans more likely to accept 
counterattitudinal information.  Recent research demonstrates that—on 
politicized, controversial issues like climate change—“uncongenial,” 
unwelcome, or “counterattitudinal” information—is more likely to be 
believed when communicated by co-partisan sources: 
 
                                                
355 James N. Druckman & Mary C. McGrath, The Evidence for Motivated Reasoning in 
Climate Change Preference Formation, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 111-119 (2019) 
(noting that people who believe in climate change might seek out “significantly less 
conservative media (which tends to be skeptical of climate change) and more non-
conservative media” because they are “accuracy-driven audience members seeking 
information from sources they perceive as credible”).  
356 See id. (citing research findings that “the very sources that people find credible are the 
ones with whom they share common beliefs”). 
357 Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RESEARCH 147 
(2011).   
358 “Partisans are quick to evaluate media messages based on the ideological affiliation of 
the source are less likely to be persuaded or otherwise influenced by messages from 
attitude-discrepant sources than from attitude-consistent sources.” R. Kelly Garret et al., 
Implications of Pro- and Counterattitudinal Information Exposure for Affective 
Polarization, HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 1, 4 (2014) (citation omitted). 
359 POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA HABITS, supra note 177, at 5. 




Partisans making statements that do not align with their 
perceived group’s position may draw greater attention to 
the frame’s content, may be seen as a ‘costly’ signal 
thereby enhancing its perceived honesty and credibility, or 
may reduce identity protective forms of motivated 
reasoning that would otherwise lead to the rejection of 
arguments related to a polarized and highly salient issue 
such as climate change.360   
 
Accordingly, when like-minded partisan media report “surprising” facts to 
press consumers that cut against the source’s political leanings, that 
reporting can “break through the barriers that impede communication 
efforts,” persuade skeptical co-partisans, and help build consensus on the 
most contentious and politicized of subjects.361  
 
While this kind of reporting might be relatively “rare,”362 when it occurs it 
can be a powerful impetus toward truth and is uniquely market-enhancing 
because it mitigates and overcomes one of the most tenacious and 
intransigent cognitive limitations—our tendency to engage in partisan 
motivated reasoning363—in a way that few other things can.364    
 
All told, while we recognize the risks that the growth of partisan media 
poses to the marketplace of ideas, the partisan nature of any particular 
media outlet does not necessarily preclude it from serving market-
enhancing functions. The partisan nature of a media outlet therefore 
should not automatically disqualify it from receiving the special 
                                                
360 Bolsen et al., supra note 351. 
361 Id. (reporting empirical research that “clearly demonstrates the power that trusted in-
group (i.e., in-party leaders) sources could play in overcoming hurdles posed by partisan 
polarization on climate change,” altering not beliefs “about the threats that climate 
change presents and willingness to support policy action, but also . . .  broader 
perceptions about [whether climate research is politicized] and even beliefs that climate 
change is a hoax”). See also Salil D. Benegal & Lyle A Scruggs, Correcting 
Misinformation about Climate Change: The Impact of Partisanship in an Experimental 
Setting, 148 CLIMATIC CHANGE 61, 62-63 (2018) (noting that “we should expect 
partisans who speak against their own interests to be more powerful persuasive sources 
on highly polarized issues” because partisans “who make such statements are engaging in 
more potentially costly behavior that lend them additional persuasive value”). 
362 LEVENDUSKY, supra note 340, at 20 (“While such counterideological signals provide 
voters with valuable information, they are valuable precisely because they are rare.”).   
363 See Benegal & Scruggs, supra note 361, at 62 (suggesting that climate-change 
messaging featuring Republicans “speaking against their expected partisan positions” 
helps “reduce identity-based processing or ‘cultural cognition’ about climate change”) 
(citations omitted). 
364 Indeed, a fair amount of empirical research suggests that most other potential 
techniques for countering motivated  reasoning are unlikely to succeed. “Naïve 
realism”—the ability to identify the effects of bias and motivated reasoning in others, but 
not in one’s self—means that simple exhortations to people to be more “objective” or 
“open-minded” may be counterproductive because those reminders may heighten 
people’s attention to other’s biases, but not their own. Kahan, supra note 114, at 22-23. 
The result may be entrenchment of the belief that one’s own views are “objective,” and 
that the differing views of others are fatally compromised by bias. Id. 




protections of the press clause, particularly because there are some 
market-enhancing functions that partisan media are sometimes particularly 
well suited to perform.  Of course, partisan entities, like any entities, that 
traffic in disinformation and propaganda are market-destructive and 
should not qualify for Press Clause protections. Fortunately, there still 
seem to be limits to what most media consumers will trust, even when a 
source vying for their attention and allegiance is ideologically friendly. 
Although Republicans tend to place less trust in “mainstream news” 
sources than Democrats, “both Democrats and Republicans gave 
mainstream media sources substantially higher trust scores than either 




This Post-Truthism moment is an important one—for considering the 
actual limitations of information consumers, for assessing how the 
jurisprudence of press freedom has been constructed, and for thinking 
critically about how it ought to be shaped going forward. 
 
The Supreme Court’s press-freedom case law has been operating on false 
assumptions about the capacities, desires, and behaviors of press 
audiences, and that gap poses serious challenges to the Court’s conception 
of the marketplace of ideas. Rather than undercutting the marketplace 
rationales for press protection, however, these limitations heighten the 
need to identify and bolster press entities performing market-enhancing 
functions that compensate for the individual limitations of information 
consumers. 
 
In the end, the refocused marketplace-of-ideas approach we urge here 
allows the Court to acknowledge the flaws of individual information 
seekers without abandoning the aspiration of fact-based, public reasoning. 
It also serves to strengthen the institutions that promote these norms and 
suggests to individual information seekers how they can use press 
coverage to compensate for their own shortcomings and fulfill their 
democratic responsibilities. This function-based approach will be 
particularly important in the changing media landscape, allowing the 
doctrine to identify and embrace “the press” as it shifts from legacy media 
to other methods of newsgathering and news delivery. Protecting 
institutions that enhance the marketplace of ideas, whatever their form, 
will serve the constitutional goals of the Press Clause and enhance the 
search for truth in meaningful ways. 
                                                
365 Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Fighting Misinformation on Social Media 
Using Crowdsourced Judgments of News Source Quality, PNAS Latest Articles (2018) 1, 
2, available at https://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1806781116 (“While these 
differences were significantly smaller for Republicans than Democrats, Republicans were 
still quite discerning. For example, Republicans trusted mainstream media sources often 
seen as left-leaning, such as CNN, MSNBC, or the New York Times, more than well-
known right-leaning hyperpartisan sites like Breitbart or Infowars.”). 	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3588625
